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ABSTRACT
In a model of industry standard setting with private information about firms' intellectual property,
we analyze (a) firms' incentives to contribute to the development and improvement of a standard, and
(b) firms' decision to disclose the existence of relevant intellectual property to other participants of
the standard-setting process. If participants can disclose after the end of the process and fully exploit
their bargaining leverage, then patent holders aspire to disclose always after the end of the process.
However, if a patent holder cannot rely on the other participants to always contribute to the process,
then it may be inclined to disclose before the end of the process. We also analyze under which conditions
firms enter cross-licensing agreements that eliminate the strategic aspect of patent disclosure, and
show that, in an institutional setting that implies a waiver of intellectual property rights if patents are
not disclosed timely, firms aspire to disclose before the end of the process. Finally, we study the effect
of product-market competition on patent disclosure.
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1 Introduction
Industry standards are developed and implemented to facilitate the interoperability
of products and increase their value to customers (Scotchmer, 2004:289ff; Shapiro
and Varian, 1998). Other benefits are the reduction of production cost (Thompson,
1954), improvement in the rate of diffusion of new technologies (Rysman and Simcoe,
2008), and the elimination of mis-coordination among producers (Farrell and Klem-
perer, 2007:2026f). In this paper, we study how the effectiveness of the process of
developing and improving a standard is affected when new technologies are patent-
protected. We ask to what extent strategic disclosure of these patents undermines the
work of a standard setting organization (SSO).
Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007) study the relationship between intellectual prop-
erty disclosure rules and the level of license prices1 and find that firms’ propensity to
disclose depends on the value of the royalty fees they expect to raise. This result sug-
gests that disclosure of patents may be used strategically as it can provide the patent
holder with a bargaining leverage over prospective users. This is often referred to as
patent holdup,2 an issue at the core of many high profile antitrust cases.3 In addition,
the empirical analysis in Layne-Farrar (2011b) documents that, in absence of a clear
rule, firms postpone the disclosure of relevant patents until the end of the standard-
setting process, i.e., after the publication of a standard version (ex-post disclosure).
The introduction of a disclosure rule, clarifying firms’ obligation to declare (i.e., dis-
close) relevant patents before the publication of a standard, then triggers earlier patent
declarations (ex-ante disclosure).4
We develop a formal game theoretic model to shed light on firms’ incentives to
contribute to a standard-setting process and to disclose patents they hold. We answer
the following questions: Is ex-ante disclosure ever feasible in absence of an obligation,
and what is the impact of the disclosure rules on the timing of patent disclosure? What
are the incentives to enter a cross-licensing agreement and thus, to contractually solve
1Throughout the paper we refer to patents as the source of intellectual property rights.
2See Farrell, Hayes, Shapiro, and Sullivan (2007), Lemley and Shapiro (2007), Farrell and Shapiro
(2008), Ganglmair, Froeb, and Werden (forthcoming), Shapiro (2010), or Tarantino (2011), among
others. The patent holdup problem is a greatly debated issue in the law and economics literature—
with dissonant positions. Lemley and Shapiro (2007), for instance, stress the adverse impact of holdup
on licensing decisions in industries with complex products, whereas Geradin (2009) suggests the real
impact of patent holdup on the correct functioning of standard setting organizations be over-rated.
3In the FTC matters against Dell Computer Corp. (Dell Computer Corp., FTC Docket NO. C-
3658, 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996)) and Rambus Inc. (FTC v. Rambus Inc., 522 F.3d 456, D.C. Cir. 2008 ),
the European Commission against Rambus (“Antitrust: Commission confirms sending a Statement
of Objections to Rambus”, MEMO/07/330 ), or Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 3d
Cir. 2007, accusers contended that patentees failed to comply with the SSO’s disclosure rules.
4Layne-Farrar (2011b) studies the timing of more than 14,000 patent declarations (i.e., disclosure)
in the European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) as of December 2010. The dataset
contains declarations to important mobile telecom related ETSI projects, such as GPRS, GSM, UMTS,
and WCDMA. In November 2005, ETSI modified its disclosure rule to clarify what was meant by
“timely” disclosure in relation to the development of standards and technical specifications.
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the patent holdup problem prior to standard setting? Finally, what role does market
competition play and how does it affect firms’ incentives? We address these questions
by means of a dynamic model with asymmetric information that draws on Stein (2008),
in which two firms are engaged in the process of standard setting. They contribute to
the standard by taking turns in suggesting new ideas for standard improvements.
The model is based on three main assumptions: First, ideas for improvements are
complementary insofar as a firm can find a new idea only if the other firm has suggested
an idea in the previous round (Hellmann and Perotti, 2011; Stein, 2008).5 Second,
firms may hold a patent on an idea they communicate, and we assume asymmetric
information about the existence of such a patent. This means, a firm j does not know
about a firm i’s patent but has prior beliefs. Likewise, firm i does not know about
firm j’s patent, but has prior beliefs.6 The implication of this assumption is that,
unless disclosed by its holder, members of an SSO may at best have a prior belief as
to whether a given (essential) technology in the standard is patent-protected. Third,
the patent holder can demand the payment of license fees from other firms producing
within the standard. These license fees depend on and are strictly increasing in the
patent holder’s bargaining leverage which in return, is a result of the technology users’
lock-in. Such lock-in arises when firms rely on the standard (yet to be published and
adopted), make a standard-specific investment, and manufacture final products based
on the present state of the standard proposal.7 We assume that the extent of lock-in
increases as the patent holder delays disclosure of its patent.
For our baseline model, participants can disclose after the end of the process (ex
post) and fully exploit their bargaining leverage without incurring any cost. Under this
modeling assumption, we show that if a patent holder expects the other participant
to always contribute to the process with an idea for standard improvement, then it is
in its best interest to contribute itself and disclose as late as possible (Proposition 2).
This implies—consistent with the empirical evidence in Layne-Farrar (2011b)—that
if the participants prefer the standard-setting process to continue, we expect aspired
patent disclosure to be ex post. However, if a patent holder cannot rely on the other
participant to always contribute to the process, then in equilibrium the disclosure
decision is constrained and the patent holder may be inclined to disclose ex ante. We
5If a firm j in t+1 does not exchange a new idea, then firm i gains no new insights and information.
If, then, firm i were to find a new idea in t + 2, it would have already found and communicated the
idea in t.
6Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007:911) report that “due to the . . . complexity of patent portfolios,
rivals frequently could not determine ‘the needle in the haystack’: that is, which patents were relevant
to a given standard-setting effort.” More generally, as reported in a public hearing conducted by the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in 2007, the identification of a patent that is
relevant to the development of a specific standard imposes significant search costs on SSO participants
(U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, 2007:43).
7Firms, e.g., in highly innovative and dynamic industries, invest in standard-specific technologies
during the process because they expect the market for the final standard-based product to be short-
lived. Only by such early investment can they capitalize on respective market opportunities. See
Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for a comprehensive review of the literature on lock-in.
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thus show that ex-ante equilibrium disclosure is observable even in the absence of a
disclosure rule (Propositions 3 and 4). Such a constrained disclosure decision arises
when the other firm expects to pay a large license fee were the process to continue
without disclosure, inducing it to stop (absent disclosure) and limit the patent holder’s
bargaining leverage. The motivation for the patent holder to reveal private information
is to salvage the standard-setting process.
In two extensions, we analyze the impact of licensing and standard-setting spe-
cific institutions on disclosure. We first introduce the possibility of cross-licensing
eliminating the strategic aspect of patent disclosure. Firms can enter cross-licensing
agreements by which they commit to license each other any intellectual property they
may hold. We show that such agreements are feasible when at least one firm is pes-
simistic about the size and scope of its patent portfolio and thus, its chances to gain
higher expected profits in a non-cooperative environment than with the cross-licensing
agreement (Proposition 5).8
We then assume an institutional setting that implies a waiver of intellectual prop-
erty rights if patents are not disclosed in a timely manner to other participants.9 As
before, firms are inclined to delay disclosure in order to increase their bargaining lever-
age (i.e., license fees), but by such a delay, they run the risk of not getting to disclose
in time and see their intellectual property rights waived. We find that the introduction
of a disclosure rule with an implied waiver induces firms to disclose ex ante, that is
before the end of the process (Proposition 6). This result is consistent with the finding
in Layne-Farrar (2011b) that the introduction of such a rule prompts earlier disclosure.
In a final step, we assume that standard-setting participants compete on the prod-
uct market. We thus introduce the very tradeoff analyzed in Stein (2008): A longer
standard-setting process increases the quality of the standard, so firms share a common
interest in continuing to contribute to the process as long as possible. On the other
hand, if a firm stops contributing and does not reveal a new idea for improvement, it
gains a competitive advantage over its product-market rival.10 This latter effect intro-
duces an additional incentive not to contribute but to halt communication during the
8Other studies in this literature discuss the use of cross-licensing to reduce the level of royalty rates
(Shapiro, 2001), look at the relationship between cross-licensing and the pace of the innovation race
(Fershtman and Kamien, 1992), or show that firms with higher asset specificity have greater incentive
to cross-license (Galasso, forthcoming).
9The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled in Qualcomm Inc. v. Broad-
com Corp., Docket Number 07-1545, Nos. 2007-1545, 2008-1162, at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-
federal-circuit/1150919.html: “[W]e agree with the district court that, ‘[t]he working policy of
disclosure of related patents is treated by the group . . . as imposing an obligation to dis-
close information.’ . . . [W]e conclude that it was within the district court’s authority . . .
to determine that Qualcomm’s misconduct falls within the doctrine of waiver . . . and re-
mand with instructions to enter an un-enforceability remedy limited in scope to any [standard]-
compliant products.” See also the European Commission’s decision on the Rambus case at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1897.
10Layne-Farrar (2011a) argues that, due to the incremental nature of the standard-setting process
in ETSI, firms often develop valuable ideas right after standard publication and use them oppor-
tunistically to gain an advantage on the product market. This evidence is consistent with the type
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standard-setting process. Accordingly, we find that competition reduces firms’ incen-
tives to contribute to the process implying an even stronger prevalence of constrained
disclosure (Proposition 8). Second, we show that product market collusion spurs firms’
communication and hence limits the scope for disclosure to be constrained in equilib-
rium. Third, we analyze a standard setting environment characterized by the presence
of a “lead firm” that has access to a larger market than its competitor. We show that
this reduces incentives to contribute to the standard-setting process, constrains firms’
disclosure decision, and results in earlier disclosure.
The literature on standard setting has typically focused on the importance of SSOs
in limiting producers mis-coordination (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007) and has analyzed
the strategic conflicts that may influence their technology adoption decisions (Farrell
and Simcoe, forthcoming; Lerner and Tirole, 2006; Simcoe, 2012).11,12 This view is con-
sistent with the instances of standard definitions in the presence of a limited number
of competing technologies, such as Matsushita’s VHS vs. Sony’s Betamax or Sony’s
Blu-ray Disc vs. Toshiba’s HD-DVD. Our modeling approach, on the other hand, cap-
tures standard setting in environments characterized by a genuine need to develop a
standardized technology. This is the case in SSOs such as ETSI or JEDEC, where firms
repeatedly meet to develop a standard by exchanging ideas in a cooperative environ-
ment. Our findings suggest that the functioning of these processes is by asymmetric
information or product market competition.13
Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007) analyze the interaction between firms’ disclosure
and licensing decisions. In their theoretical setup, a patent holder decides to disclose by
trading off the need to reassure users that they will not be held up against the fear to
reveal its own technological strategies. They show, theoretically and empirically, that
if a patent holder expects to raise a higher royalty rate, then its incentives to disclose
its patent increase.14 We develop on their analysis by characterizing the timing of
the disclosure decision and by relating this decision to standard setting and market
of competitive advantage that a firm acquires by concealing an idea for improvement to the other
standard setting participant in our model.
11Farrell and Simcoe (forthcoming) study the impact of vested interests on SSOs technology adop-
tion. In their setup, the standard-setting process is modeled as a war of attrition between two
technology owners. Simcoe (2012) develops a model of standard setting in the presence of conflicting
interests among technology proponents and shows that Internet commercialization caused a slowdown
in standard setting at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Lerner and Tirole (2006) analyze
the role of SSOs as technology certifiers. In their model, the technology owner chooses an SSO to solve
the trade-off between trying a tough certifier (reducing the probability of technology endorsement) or
a soft certifier (making users less likely to adopt the standard).
12The empirical literature shows that these strategic effects are likely to be amplified if the standard
incorporates intellectual property. See Weiss and Sirbu (1990) or Farrell and Klemperer (2007). Also,
Feldman, Graham, and Simcoe (2009) document that patents disclosed to SSOs are highly litigated.
13See Layne-Farrar (2011a) who characterizes the implementation details of the UMTS standard as
innovation incremental in nature. Another example of this innovative class of standard-setting pro-
cesses is IETF. Simcoe (2012:312f) describes the early IETF as an SSO that “creates and maintains”
standards, with early members being academic and government researchers.
14More specifically, their empirical investigation shows that a stricter intellectual property rule
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institutions. We thus provide a setup that helps identify whether a patent holder has
incentives to hold up prospective users, a critical issue in the antitrust cases mentioned
above.
Our results further contribute to the literature on knowledge diffusion and collective
decision making. Hellmann and Perotti (2011) analyze the “symbiotic interaction” of
firms and markets in the process of developing and promoting new ideas. Stein (2008)
presents a model in which product market competitors exchange ideas to increase the
value of the market but at the same time have an incentive not to contribute to this
process to reap profits from this increased market value. Our model, built on the
basic framework in Stein (2008), extends his analysis by considering the effect on this
process of patents and their disclosure. Haeussler, Jiang, Thursby, and Thursby (2009)
build a model of knowledge diffusion among academic scientists. As in our analysis,
complementary information is needed to solve a problem. Yet, while they assume
that each agent can quit the information sharing game with their own solution to the
problem, in our model a successful standard-setting process requires collaboration of
all parties involved.15
We also contribute on the literature that studies the impact of competition on the
incentives to share knowledge. In particular, our result that competition inhibits the
communication of ideas for improvement (see Propositions 7 and 8) is consistent with
the findings in von Hippel (1987) and Pe´rez-Castrillo and Sandon´ıs (1996) where coop-
erative communication between competitors can take place provided tough competition
is not at work.16 We deliver the analogous result that harsher competition threatens
firms’ discussions and prevents cooperative standard-setting.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the setup, in Section 3
we present the equilibrium results for the baseline model. We discuss the extensions of
cross-licensing and disclosure rules in Section 4 and the extension of product-market
competition in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The formal proofs of the results are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Basic Model
We consider two firms, A and B, that take turns in creating or improving an existing
technology as industry standard. They do this by exchanging ideas for improvement
(such as a mandating royalty-free provision) is negatively associated with the presence of a disclosure
requirement.
15Anton and Yao (2002) consider disclosure of knowledge (from pure ideas to inventions) when
intellectual property rights offer only limited protection. Disclosure in this context is related to the
sale of ideas and not a contribution to a creative process.
16von Hippel (1987) discusses an example from the aerospace industry, where firms competing for
an important government contract report not to trade information with rivals. Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Sandon´ıs (1996) argue that in research joint ventures partners have little incentive to share information
when they are simultaneously competitors in other markets.
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that arrive with exogenous probability.17 Once the process comes to an end, the stan-
dard comprises the stock of ideas exchanged. The larger the number of improvements,
the more valuable the standard is to the firms. Firms may hold patents on these
ideas that allow them to collect license fees. Below we describe in more detail the
standard-setting process and the firms’ payoffs.
2.1 Standard-Setting Process
The firms take turns with A moving at stages t = 1, 3, 5, . . . and B moving at stages
t = 2, 4, 6, . . .. We denote the first stage at which a firm i gets to move by t0i so that
t0A = 1, t
0
B = 2, and Ti := {t0i , t0i + 2, t0i + 4, . . .}. At stage t = 1, firm A has access to a
patent-protected technology χ1, and firm B has a prior belief pi
B > 0 this technology
is protected by a patent. If, at t = 1, firm A shares this technology with firm B,
then B observes with probability p ∈ (0, 1) a technology or idea χ2 that improves
firm A’s technology and thus increases the value of the standard. Firm A has a prior
belief piA > 0 that this χ2 is patent-protected. All future ideas χt, t ≥ 3, are not
patent-protected. Beliefs Pr(i = i1) = pi
j and Pr(i = i0) = 1 − Pr(i = i1) = 1 − pij,
where i = i1 denotes a patent holder i and i = i0 a non-patent holder i, are common
knowledge.
Once a new idea has arrived, firm A at any odd t ∈ TA and firm B at any even
t ∈ TB have three possible actions: (1) stop, S (not share χt), (2) continue, C (share χt
but not the fact that χt0i is patent-protected), or (3) disclose, D (share χt and, if not
done so at an earlier stage, the fact that χt0i is patent-protected). Let τi ≥ t0i denote
the period in which firm i discloses the patent, then the firms’ action sets at each t are:
S1|t≤τi = {S,C,D} , S1|t>τi = S0|t = {S,C} . (1)
Note that if firm i chooses to continue but not to disclose the patent at t = t0i , it
can reconsider and disclose at any later t. The structure of the game is depicted in
Figure 1.18
A firm cannot credibly communicate that it does not have a patent on its tech-
nology. Moreover, patents are fully verifiable,19 implying that a non-patent holder
cannot credibly claim that she does have a patent. We restrict firms’ pre-commitment
as follows:
ASSUMPTION 1. Firms cannot at any time t precommit to disclose at t+k, k ≥ 2.
17Firms may have a lot of ideas, yet ideas that actually improve the standard arrive with constant
probability.
18Figure 1 depicts only the part of the decision tree in which firm A is a patent holder. Due to the
one-sidedness of the decision tree, firm B’s information sets are not depicted. As long as i has not
disclosed, firm j forms posterior beliefs pijt as to whether firm i’s initial technology is patent-protected.
Firm j’s posterior beliefs are given in brackets. Decision nodes without this bracket notation have
posterior beliefs of pijt = 1 because i has disclosed the patent.
19Patents are identifiable through a unique patent number. In the U.S. and other jurisdictions, the
directory of patents can be accessed by the public.
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The decision to disclose can take place either before the standard-setting process
has come to an end or after the process is over. We refer to disclosure before the
process has come to an end as ex-ante disclosure, and to disclosure after the process is
over as ex-post disclosure.
A central assumption about the process of standard setting is the strict comple-
mentarity of ideas (Hellmann and Perotti, 2011; Stein, 2008).
ASSUMPTION 2. Ideas are strictly complementary. If a new idea does not arrive
or one of the firms decides to stop, the standard-setting process ends.
If at t a new idea has arrived and the firm decides to either disclose or continue by
sharing the idea with its competitor, in t+1 a new idea χt+1 will arrive with probability
p. If a firm has not disclosed and the process comes to an end in t, then it can disclose
in t.
2.2 Product Market Profits
After the standard-setting process has come to an end, firms market respective brands
and profits realize. For the baseline scenario we assume that firms i and j are both
monopolists in a market of unit mass. In a latter section we allow for competition in
a segment of this market.
The product-market effects of the standard are of either one of the following two
types: (a) Due to interoperability or network effects, the standard increases the con-
sumers’ reservation value of a good that manufacturers are able to produce at constant,
say zero, cost (Scotchmer, 2004; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007); and (b) the standard
lowers the costs of production of a good for which consumers have a constant reserva-
tion value of one (Thompson, 1954).
The value of the standard, i.e., the positive effect on the reservation value or the
cost savings, increases with the number of ideas of improvement exchanged and thus,
with the number of rounds of the standard-setting process. We denote this number by
nS ≥ 0. A function h(nS) captures the reservation-value or cost-saving effect.
ASSUMPTION 3. h(nS) is increasing and continuous in nS with h(0) = 0 and
lim
nS→∞
h(nS) = 1.
The product market profits are equal to:
Ri = h(ni). (2)
To see this, suppose the standard is of type (a) and increases the consumers’ reservation
value of the good. Let h(ni) denote this reservation value for a product i that is
developed on a stock ni of ideas. A consumer’s utility from buying product i at price
pi is equal to:
ui(pi) = h(ni)− pi. (3)
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Consumers will purchase for any price pi ≤ h(ni), and firm i will set pi = h(ni). If
the standard-setting process stops because a new idea does not arrive, then h(ni) =
h(nS) = h(nj). Alternatively, if firm i stops the process by not communicating an idea
to firm j, then h(ni) = h(nS + 1) > h(nS) = h(nj). With zero production costs, the
profits are equal to the firm’s revenues, h(ni).
Alternatively, suppose the standard is of type (b) and lowers the firms’ costs of
production (Stein, 2008). More specifically, a firm having access to a stock of ideas ni
produces the good at cost 1− h(ni). If firm i decides not to communicate a new idea,
then firm i’s production costs are 1− h(nS + 1) < 1− h(nS). Firm i sets a price equal
to the consumers’ reservation value of 1. Its profits are then equal to h(ni).
2.3 License Fees
If firm i owns a patent on one of the technologies incorporated into the standard, it can
extract parts of firm j’s market profits as license fees. These fees depend on the degree
of lock-in of firm j and the resulting bargaining leverage for firm i (i.e., holdup). The
function σi : Ti → [0, 1) is defined as the fraction of firm j’s product market profits
firm i can extract as license fees.
ASSUMPTION 4 (License Fees).
1. σi(τi) is continuous and strictly increasing in τi ∈ Ti;
2. σi(τi) > 0 if and only if τi > t
0
i , σi(t
0
i ) = 0 otherwise, and limt→∞ σi(t) < 1.
The positive effect of τi on σi(τi) reflects the impact of lock-in into a standard. As
more ideas for improvement, χt, are added to the standard, the longer the standard-
setting process continues, and the more likely firms will have invested in relationship-
specific assets (in reliance on the standard to be approved). Note that subscript i for
the license fee function σi allows for firm heterogeneity. Such differences in bargaining
leverage may arise, e.g., through differences in average strength of a firm’s patents in
its patent portfolio.
The forces that induce firms to invest before the end of the process, even at the
prospect of lock-in, deserves more discussion. The standard-setting process we consider
takes place in innovative and dynamic markets. For instance, firms in ETSI operate in
the mobile telephony market, firms in JEDEC operate in the electronics industry. The
market opportunities faced by these firms are subject to a high degree of uncertainty:
Companies in related sectors, even if not direct competitors, may enter to supply new
products. This means that if SSO members design their products after the standard
is adopted, they lose weeks or months in which they could otherwise already market
their products (had they started designing these products during the standard-setting
discussions). Thus, if standard-specific investment is a time-consuming process, there is
an incentive for firms to invest before the standard is decided. Moreover, if this process
is sufficiently long, and the market (after standard setting) is likely to be persistent,
10
then firms are likely to invest (and thus lock in) during standard setting even if they
fear holdup.
Product market profits Ri in (2) are the firms’ total payoffs when license fees are
equal to zero. We denote the firms’ total payoffs when accounting for license fees by
Ui: Ui(i, j) are firm i’s total payoffs when both i and j have disclosed their intellectual
property:
Ui(i, j) = (1− σj(τj))Ri + σi(τi)Rj; (4)
Ui(i, 0) are firm i’s total payoffs when i has disclosed and j does not own intellectual
property or has not disclosed:
Ui(i, 0) = Ri + σi(τi)Rj; (5)
Ui(0, j) are firm i’s total payoffs when i has not disclosed and j has disclosed:
Ui(0, j) = (1− σj(τj))Ri +Rj; (6)
finally, Ui(0, 0) = Ri.
Whether or not the firms disclose their intellectual property has no impact on this
value as disclosure has no social value. This is because:
Ui(i, j) + Uj(j, i) = Ui(i, 0) + Uj(0, i) =
Ui(0, j) + Uj(j, 0) = Ui(0, 0) + Uj(0, 0) = Ri +Rj. (7)
Hence, in a first-best world, both firms communicate respective ideas for standard
improvement until a new idea fails to arrive. This maximizes the expected number of
ideas, nS, and thus, the value of the standard.
3 Equilibrium Analysis of Patent Disclosure
In this section, we present the results of the non-cooperative communication and dis-
closure game. By the assumption of full verifiability of patents, if a firm does not hold a
patent, then it cannot disclose a patent. In the complementary case in which firms own
intellectual property, we first consider the subgame in which both firms have already
disclosed their patents. We then proceed to the discussion of firms’ unconstrained or
aspired disclosure date. Given that after disclosure both firms will continue the process
until a new idea fails to arrive, we show that firm i’s date of disclosure when firm j’s
communication incentives are always satisfied is ex post, i.e., not until the standard-
setting process has come to an end. In a third step, we derive the equilibrium disclosure
date by explicitly accounting for the possibility that firm j’s communication incentives
are not always satisfied so that firm i does not reach its aspired disclosure date but
will, in equilibrium, disclose before then (ex-ante disclosure).
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3.1 Post-Disclosure Communication
Suppose all firms own intellectual property and all patents have been disclosed, so that
in all t, firms choose their actions from S1|t>max{τi,τj}. In the following proposition we
show that in this case, firms will in all t > max{τi, τj} continue the standard-setting
process until a new idea fails to arrive.
PROPOSITION 1. Given both firms have disclosed intellectual property, the standard-
setting process will continue in all t > max{τi, τj} until a new idea fails to arrive.
Following disclosure, both firms have a clear incentive to contribute to the process
in order to increase the value of respective product market profits. The rationale is
straightforward. Once the existence of relevant intellectual property has been revealed
and σi(τi) and σj(τj) determined, it is in firm i’s best interest to maximize the con-
tinuation payoffs by contributing to the process as long as possible. This is because
firm i receives a fraction 1− σj(τj) + σi(τi) > 0 of the benefits of continuing standard
setting. Moreover, there are no gains from stopping the process.
3.2 Unconstrained or Aspired Patent Disclosure
Before disclosure of their patent, both firms anticipate that once disclosed, the standard-
setting process continues until a new idea fails to arrive. We now look at a patent holder
i’s aspired disclosure date, i.e., the date τai ∈ Ti for which it is individually optimal for
firm i to disclose when it is not constrained by firm j’s communication incentives. For
this, we assume that firm j does not stop the process and its behavior is not otherwise
affected by firm i’s decision. Likewise, we assume for now that firm i does not find it
optimal to stop the process. We reconsider this decision when we analyze equilibrium
disclosure below.
A patent holder firm i in t decides whether to disclose in t or continue and (possibly)
disclose in t + 2. By Assumption 1, firm i cannot commit to disclose in either t + 2
or t + 4. It will instead, in t + 2, again face the decision of whether to disclose in
t + 2 or continue in t + 2 and possibly disclose in t + 4. As long as the payoffs from
disclosing in a period t, EtUi(D@t), are lower than the payoffs from waiting one round
and reconsidering the decision in t + 2, EtUi(D@t + 2), the firm will not disclose. It
will therefore disclose if, and only if,
EtUi(D@t) > EtUi(D@t+ 2) (8)
with
EtUi(D@t) = (1 + σi(t))H(t)− piitΛjt(τj) (9)
and
EtUi(D@t+ 2) = H(t) + (1− p)σi(t+ 1)h(t) + pσi(t+ 2)H(t+ 1)− piitΛjt(τj). (10)
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The expression
H(t) =
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t+ k) (11)
reflects the firm’s expected product market profits when the process continues until a
new idea fails to arrive. The term Λjt(τj) reflects firm i’s expected license payments to
a patent holder j. These will depend on firm i’s expected product market profits and
firm j’s realized or anticipated disclosure date, τj. By our working assumptions for the
case of unconstrained disclosure, τj is not affected by firm i’s disclosure decision and
is thus the same in (9) and (10). Hence, Λjt(τj) is the same in (9) and (10). Moreover,
beliefs piit and firm i’s product market profits are unaffected by firm i’s decision. Note
that if τj < t, i.e., firm j has already disclosed its patent, then pi
i
t = 1. Given (8), (9),
and (10) we show the following:
PROPOSITION 2. Patent holders’ aspired disclosure date, τai ∈ Ti, i = A,B, is
after the standard-setting process has come to an end when a new idea has failed to
arrive.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Suppose firm i has disclosed in
τi < τ
a
i , then the fraction of firm j’s profits that it can extract is σi(τi). Continuing
communication after disclosure increases the value of the standard and thus the firms’
market profits, whereas fraction σi(τi) is fixed for all t ≥ τi. Since σi(τi) is increasing
in τi and late disclosure does not come at a cost, disclosing in τi < τ
a
i is dominated by
later disclosure. The latest disclosure date possible is when the process has come to an
end because a new idea has failed to arrive.20 This result is consistent with the findings
of substantial ex-post disclosure in ETSI as documented by Layne-Farrar (2011b).
3.3 Constrained or Equilibrium Patent Disclosure
For firm i’s equilibrium disclosure we have to account for firm j’s incentives in t + 1,
which in return will depend on the behavior of both types of firm i. In the previous
section, we assumed that firm j does not want to stop the process. But what if this is
not true, what if firm j would rather stop than continue the standard-setting process?
We now show that this threat of stop induces firm i to disclose ex ante and thus, alter
firm j’s expected payoffs such that j will indeed want to continue.
We proceed in two steps. We first assume firm j has disclosed its patent and show
ex-ante disclosure is a possible equilibrium outcome, i.e., we show in Proposition 3 that
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which firm i discloses its patent prior to its aspired
patent disclosure date, τ ∗i < τ
a
i , exists. We then continue deriving in Proposition 4
conditions under which, in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, firm j discloses its patent
before its aspired patent disclosure date, τ ∗j < τ
∗
i < τ
a
i = τ
a
j , when the other firm has
yet to disclose.
20The expected disclosure date coincides with the expected duration of the standard-setting process,
E1τ
a
i = 1 +
∑∞
k=0 p
k(1− p)k = 11−p .
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3.3.1 Firms’ Payoffs After Firm j’s Disclosure
We denote by i = i1 a patent holder firm i and by i = i0 a non-patent holder firm i;
likewise for firm j. Assume firm j has disclosed its patent (so that j = j1). The payoffs
for firm j in t+ 1 and for firm i in t are as follows:
Firm j with S1|t>τj : Suppose firm j has disclosed in τj < t. In period t + 1 and all
following, firm j either stops or continues the standard-setting process, S1|t>τj = {S,C}.
Assuming for a moment that firm i continues or discloses (that is, it does not stop, ¬S)
in t+ 2 if firm j continues in t+ 1, firm j’s expected payoffs are:
Et+1Uj1(S@t+ 1|τj) =
(
1− pijt+1σi(t+ 1)
)
h(t+ 1) + σj(τj)h(t); (12a)
Et+1Uj1(C@t+ 1|τj,¬S) = H(t+ 1)− pijt+1Λit+1(τi) + σj(τj)H(t+ 1), (12b)
where, by Lemma A1 in the appendix,
Λit+1(τi) =
τi−(t+2)∑
k=0
pk(1− p)σi(t+ 2 + k)h(t+ 1 + k) + pτi−(t+1)σi(τi)H(τi) (13)
denotes firm j’s expected license payments to firm i when firm i is a patent holder and
anticipated to disclose in τi ≥ t+ 2 (given firm j continues in t+ 1). It is increasing in
τi (Lemma A1). Note that if firm j anticipates firm i to disclose when aspired, τi = τ
a
i ,
then:
Λit+1(τ
a
i ) := lim
τi→∞
Λit+1(τi) =
∞∑
k=0
pk(1− p)σi(t+ 2 + k)h(t+ 1 + k).
Firm i = i0 with S0|t: A non-patent holder firm i’s expected payoffs in t with choice
set S0|t = {S,C}, given firm j’s anticipated move in t+ 1, are:
Ui0(S@t|τj) = (1− σj(τj))h(t); (14a)
EtUi0(C@t|τj, S) = (1− σj(τj))h(t); (14b)
EtUi0(C@t|τj, C) = (1− σj(τj))H(t). (14c)
Firm i = i1 with S1|t≤τi: A patent holder firm i’s expected payoffs in t with choice
set S1|t≤τi = {S,C,D}, given firm j’s anticipated move in t+ 1, are:
Ui1(S@t|τj) = (1− σj(τj))h(t) + σi(t)h(t− 1); (15a)
EtUi1(C@t|τj, S) = (1− σj(τj))h(t) + σi(t+ 1) [ph(t+ 1) + (1− p)h(t)] ; (15b)
EtUi1(C@t|τj, C) = (1− σj(τj))H(t) + Λit(τi); (15c)
EtUi1(D@t|τj, S) = (1− σj(τj))h(t) + σi(t) [ph(t+ 1) + (1− p)h(t)] ; (15d)
EtUi1(D@t|τj, C) = (1− σj(τj) + σi(t))H(t). (15e)
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Analogous to (13), Λit(τi) denotes the expected license payments from firm j to firm i,
where expectations are formed in t. Observe that unlike in expression (12b), a patent
holder i1 knows its type and anticipates these expected license payments with certainty.
3.3.2 Firm i’s Disclosure After Firm j’s Disclosure
We now derive sufficient conditions for firm i to disclose in t so as to induce firm
j—which would stop otherwise—to continue in t + 1. The equilibrium results are
summarized in Proposition 3. The firms’ decisions in t and t + 1 are determined by
their types and what they anticipate the other firm will do in the subsequent period.
First, note that if firm i discloses, then by Proposition 1 firm j will continue.
Firm j in t + 1: In t + 1, firm j continues the process if (12b) ≥ (12a), i.e., if pijt+1
is sufficiently low, pijt+1 ≤ p¯ijt+1(τi), where:
p¯ijt+1(τi) =
(1 + σj(τj)) [H(t+ 1)− h(t+ 1)] + σj(τj) [h(t+ 1)− h(t)]
Λit+1(τi)− σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1)
. (16)
Observe that Λit+1(τi) > σi(t + 1)h(t + 1) for all τi ≥ t + 2 so that p¯ijt+1(τi) > 0
(Lemma A1). Since Λit+1(τi) is increasing in τi, this threshold p¯i
j
t+1(τi) is decreasing in
τi. Intuitively, firm j is more inclined to continue the standard-setting process (i) the
lower its belief pijt+1 that firm i owns a patent (associated with a lower probability of
paying license fees) and (ii) the earlier it anticipates firm i to disclose (associated with
lower license fees). Since p¯ijt+1(τi) > 0, there will always be values of pi
j
t+1 such that
firm j continues.
Firm j in t: In t, if a non-patent holder i = i0 anticipates firm j to continue in t+ 1,
firm i always continues since (14c) ≥ (14a) by:
(1− σj(τj)) [H(t)− h(t)] ≥ 0. (17)
However, if firm i anticipates firm j to stop in t + 1, then a non-patent holder i = i0
is, by the respective payoffs in (14a) and (14b), indifferent between stop and continue.
In t, if a patent holder i = i1 anticipates firm j to continue in t+ 1, then firm i will
not disclose since the payoffs from disclose in (15e) are strictly smaller than the payoffs
from continue in (15c).21 Moreover, the patent holder will not stop but continue, since
(15a) ≤ (15c) or:
(1− σj(τj)) [H(t)− h(t)] +
[
Λit(τi)− σi(t)h(t− 1)
] ≥ 0 (18)
holds, by Λit(τi) > σi(t)h(t− 1) (Lemma A1), for all t and τi ≥ t+ 1.
21By Proposition 2, if firm i anticipates the other firm to continue the process in subsequent periods,
it is never optimal to disclose the patent.
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If, instead, patent holder i = i1 anticipates firm j to stop in t + 1, then, as is
readily shown, the payoffs from stop in (15a) are strictly smaller than the payoffs from
continue in (15b), and the patent holder will not stop. If the patent holder discloses
in t, then firm j, by Proposition 1, will continue in t + 1. Firm i anticipates this and
prefers disclose (with payoffs in (15e)) to continue (with payoffs in (15b)) if
(1− σj(τj)) [H(t)− h(t)] + σi(t)H(t)
σi(t+ 1)[(1− p)h(t) + ph(t+ 1)] ≥ 1. (19)
Two conditions are central for the result on firm i’s ex-ante equilibrium disclosure:
First, firm j’s belief in t + 1 must be sufficiently high, pijt+1 > p¯i
j
t+1(τi), so that it will
stop in t+ 1 if it observes firm i to continue in t. Second, anticipating that firm j will
continue in t+ 1 if firm i discloses in t+ 1, firm i in t must prefer disclose (and see the
standard-setting process continued until a new idea fails to arrive) over continue (and
see it stopped by firm j in t + 1); i.e., condition (19) must be satisfied. Firm i thus
salvages the standard-setting process by disclosing earlier than aspired, τ ∗i < τ
a
i . In
the following proposition we show that this is the outcome of a separating equilibrium.
Other equilibria exist, and we provide a more extensive discussion of these equilibria
in the proof of the proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose firm j has disclosed its patent in τj < t. Then, firm
i discloses in τ ∗i < τ
a
i if (19) holds and firm j’s prior belief is pi
j > p¯ijt+1(τ
a
i ). This
implies ex-ante disclosure if the standard-setting process reaches t = τ ∗i .
Firm i’s incentives to disclose early, i.e., before the aspired disclosure date, in this
equilibrium stem from firm j’s threat to stop the process in t+ 1. By stopping, firm j
caps firm i’s bargaining leverage and limits the license fees to be paid to firm i. This
induces firm i to disclose its patent in t. By doing so, it itself caps its bargaining
leverage, but it also ensures the continuation of the standard-setting process (as seen
in Proposition 1). With the license fees being constant shares of the other firm’s
product market profits, it is then in the best interest of both firms to continue the
standard-setting process as long as possible.
Proposition 3 gives rise to immediate implications when the firms are “asymmetric”
in the following sense: Consider an environment in which one firm approaches other
firms with an initial idea, say χ1, that is highly developed and almost complete in its
specifications.22 Furthermore, assume that because of the advanced state of this initial
technology, it is common knowledge that the proposer, say j, has a patent. Firm i’s
prior beliefs are thus equal to one. This is equivalent to saying that firm j discloses
its patent at the beginning of the process, τj = t
0
j . This implies, by Assumption 4,
that σj(τj) = 0, rendering both conditions in the proposition less binding. In such an
environment with “asymmetric” firms, ex-ante disclosure (by the non-initiating firm)
is more likely to arise in equilibrium.
22An initiative of this sort has led to the development of the DSL standard, see DeLacey, Herman,
Kiron, and Lerner (2006:23ff).
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3.3.3 Firms’ Payoffs Before Firm j’s Disclosure
We now consider firm j’s decision to disclose the patent if no firm has disclosed yet.
We show that the reference to the results in Proposition 1, namely that if both firms
have disclosed then both firms will continue the process until a new idea fails to arrive,
is not necessary for a firm to disclose ex ante. This means, there are cases in which
firm j discloses before the other firm i has disclosed (so that Proposition 1 does not
apply). We first present the payoffs for firm j in t − 1 and then for firm i in t. Firm
j’s payoffs in t+ 1 and firm i’s payoffs in t− 2 and t+ 2 are analogous. We then derive
sufficient conditions for firm j to disclose in t− 1 below. Proposition 4 summarizes the
equilibrium results.
Firm j = j0 with S0|t−1: A non-patent holder firm j’s expected payoffs in t− 1 with
choice set S0|t−1 = {S,C}, given firm i’s anticipated move in t, are:
Et−1Uj0(S@t− 1) =
(
1− pijt−1σi(t− 1)
)
h(t− 1); (20a)
Et−1Uj0(C@t− 1|S) =
(
1− pijt−1σi(t)
)
h(t− 1); (20b)
Et−1Uj0(C@t− 1|¬S) = H(t− 1)− pijt−1Λit−1(τi) (20c)
where Λit−1(τi) for τi ≥ t is analogous to the expression in (13).
Firm j = j1 with S1|t−1≤τj : A patent holder firm j’s expected payoffs in t− 1 with
choice set S1|t−1≤τj = {S,C,D}, given firm i’s anticipated move in t, are:
Et−1Uj1(S@t− 1) =
(
1− pijt−1σi(t− 1)
)
h(t− 1) + σj(t− 1)h(t− 2); (21a)
Et−1Uj1(C@t− 1|S) =
(
1− pijt−1σi(t)
)
h(t− 1)
+ σj(t) [ph(t)− (1− p)h(t− 1)] ; (21b)
Et−1Uj1(C@t− 1|¬S) = H(t− 1)− pijt−1Λit−1(τi) + Λjt−1(τj); (21c)
Et−1Uj1(D@t− 1|S) =
(
1− pijt−1σi(t)
)
h(t− 1)
+ σj(t− 1) [ph(t) + (1− p)h(t− 1)] ; (21d)
Et−1Uj1(D@t− 1|¬S) = H(t− 1)− pijt−1Λit−1(τi) + σj(t− 1)H(t− 1). (21e)
Firm i = i0 with S0|t: A non-patent holder firm i’s expected payoffs in t with choice
set S0|t = {S,C}, given firm j’s anticipated move in t+ 1, are:
EtUi0(S@t) =
(
1− piitσj(t)
)
h(t); (22a)
EtUi0(C@t|S) =
(
1− piitσj(t+ 1)
)
h(t); (22b)
EtUi0(C@t|¬S) = H(t)− piitΛjt(τj) (22c)
with Λjt(τj) for τj ≥ t+ 1 analogous to (13).
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Firm i = i1 with S1|t≤τi: A patent holder firm i’s expected payoffs in t with choice
set S1|t≤τi = {S,C,D}, given firm j’s anticipated move in t+ 1, are:
EtUi1(S@t) =
(
1− piitσj(t)
)
h(t) + σi(t)h(t− 1); (23a)
EtUi1(C@t|S) =
(
1− piitσj(t+ 1)
)
h(t) + σi(t+ 1) [ph(t+ 1) + (1− p)h(t)] ; (23b)
EtUi1(C@t|¬S) = H(t)− piitΛjt(τj) + Λit(τi); (23c)
EtUi1(D@t|S) =
(
1− piitσj(t+ 1)
)
h(t) + σi(t) [ph(t+ 1) + (1− p)h(t)] ; (23d)
EtUi1(D@t|¬S) = H(t)− piitΛjt(τj) + σi(t)H(t). (23e)
3.3.4 Firm j’s Disclosure
The incentives for firm j to disclose in t− 1 are similar to the incentives for firm i to
disclose in t: Firm j can salvage the standard-setting process by disclosing its patent
and thus inducing firm i to continue when it would otherwise stop. This is the case
when in t− 1 firm j anticipates that firm i stops in t if firm j continues in t− 1, but,
by (17) and (18), i continues in t if j discloses in t− 1.
Firm j in t + 1: In t + 1, firm j types continue (assuming firm i does not stop in
t+2) if the payoffs from continue in (20c) (for the non-patent holder) and (21c) (for the
patent holder) are at least as high as the payoffs from stop in (20a) (for the non-patent
holder) and (21a) (for the patent holder).23 The two conditions can be rewritten as:
pijt+1 ≤ pˆijt+1(τi) :=
H(t+ 1)− h(t+ 1)
Λit+1(τi)− σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1)
> 0 (24)
for the non-patent holder and:
pijt+1 ≤
H(t+ 1)− h(t+ 1) + Λjt+1(τj)− σj(t+ 1)h(t)
Λit+1(τi)− σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1)
(25)
for the patent holder. Observe that condition (24) for the non-patent holder is more
restrictive than condition (25) for the patent holder. This should not come as a surprise.
The patent holder has stronger incentives to continue the standard-setting process as
it increases the license payment it can extract from firm i.
Firm i in t: In t, when anticipating that firm j continues in t+ 1, firm i types stop
if the payoffs from stop in (22a) (for the non-patent holder) and (23a) (for the patent
holder) are strictly greater than the payoffs from continue in (22c) (for the non-patent
23It is readily established that the payoffs from continue in (21c) are strictly greater than the payoffs
from disclose in (21e), and disclose is dominated. See Proposition 1 for a discussion.
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holder) and (23c) (for the patent holder). These two conditions can be rewritten as:
piit >
H(t)− h(t)
Λjt(τj)− σj(t)h(t)
(26)
for the non-patent holder and:
piit > p¯i
i
t(τj) :=
H(t)− h(t) + Λit(τi)− σi(t)h(t− 1)
Λjt(τj)− σj(t)h(t)
. (27)
for the patent holder. Observe that (26) for the non-patent holder is less restrictive
than condition (27) for the patent holder. This is because the patent holder’s incentives
to stop are weaker as it forgoes higher license payments from firm j. Moreover, if firm
j has disclosed in t− 1, then, by (17) and (18), firm i continues in t.
Firm j in t − 1: Anticipating that firm i in t stops if (27) holds true and firm j
continues in t − 1, a patent holder j1 discloses in t − 1 if the payoffs from disclose in
(21e) are strictly greater than the payoffs from continue in (21b). Moreover, the payoffs
from disclose must be strictly greater than the payoffs from stop in (21a). The former
condition can be rewritten as:
pijt−1 ≤ p˜ijt−1(τi) :=
(1 + σj(t− 1))H(t− 1)− pσj(t)h(t)− (1− p)h(t− 1)
Λit−1(τi)− σi(t)h(t− 1)
> 0. (28)
It is binding if the payoffs from continue are greater than the payoffs from stop. This
holds true as long as:
pijt−1 ≤
σj(t)h(t− 1)− σj(t− 1)h(t− 2) + pσj(t) [h(t)− h(t− 1)]
σi(t)h(t− 1)− σi(t− 1)h(t− 1) ; (29)
σj(t) ≥ σi(t) for all t is sufficient for this latter condition to hold true for all pijt−1. In
fact, the condition holds for all pijt−1 as long as σj(t) − σi(t) is not too negative. For
the results below we assume that this is the case so that stopping is dominated and
(28) is the relevant constraint.
Conditions (24), (27), and (28) describe the conditions that are sufficient for a
patent holder firm j to disclose its patent in t−1: Condition (24) guarantees that firm
j continues in t+ 1. Anticipating this, firm i in t stops if condition (27) is satisfied. In
t − 1, firm j anticipates that firm i will stop, and thus discloses so that, by (17) and
(18), firm i continues instead. Proposition 4 establishes this pattern as the outcome of
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 4. If pij ≤ min{pˆijt+1(τai ), p˜ijt−1(τai )} and pii > p¯iit(τaj ), then firm j
discloses in τ ∗j = t− 1 < τaj .
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Figure 2: Parameterization of Proposition 4
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Unlike in Proposition 3, in Proposition 4 we consider firm j’s disclosure decision
when the other firm has yet to disclose. We show that the conditions that need to be
fulfilled for equilibrium disclosure to be ex ante require firm j’s prior beliefs on the
existence of i’s intellectual property (pij) to be small enough and firm i’s prior beliefs
(pii) to be large enough. If pij is small, then firm j’s decision to continue the standard-
setting process (with or without disclosure) is not put at risk by the possibility that
firm i owns a patent. Conversely, if pii is large, it is firm i’s fear to have part of its
rents extracted by firm j at aspired disclosure date τaj that inhibits it to continue the
standard-setting process.
In Figure 2 we provide a parametric example for the conditions in Proposition 4,
so to show that the set of parameter values in which those conditions are satisfied is
not empty. For h(·) we use the same functional form employed by Stein (2008):
h(t) = 1− αt. (30)
Instead, the functional form for σ(·) is:
σi(t) = γi
(
1− βηi(t−t0i )
)
. (31)
Note that α = 1/2 and β = 1/2. We assume a weaker bargaining leverage for firm
i, γi = 1/4 and γj = 1; ηi = 1 for all plots. Firm j is the firm that initiates the
standard-setting process, so that t0j = 1 and t
0
i = 2. In Figure 3(a) we plot h(t) (solid),
σi(t) (dashed), and σj(t) for ηj = 1 and ηj = 1/4 (dotted). In Figure 3(b) we plot the
conditions from Proposition 4. The solid line depicts the upper bound for firm j’s prior
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beliefs, pij. This upper bound is strictly positive, and there exist values for pij such that
the conditions in Propositon 4 hold. The dotted (for ηj = 1) and dashed (ηj = 1/4) lines
depict the lower bound for firm i’s prior beliefs, pii. The lower bounds are strictly less
than unity, so there exist values for pii such that the conditions in the proposition hold
true. This implies that under relatively mild assumptions on the relative bargaining
position of each patent holder (that is, if i’s bargaining leverage is weaker than j’s) the
conditions in Proposition 4 are supported by a non-empty space of parameter values.
4 Institutions
In this section we consider two institutional extensions of our model: We first allow
firms to enter a cross-licensing agreement before the standard-setting process is ini-
tiated, at a stage at which firms are still uncertain as to whether they hold relevant
intellectual property. We show that the wedge between a firm’s degree of uncertainty
on its own intellectual property and the beliefs it holds on the existence of intellectual
property owned by the other participant shapes the decision to enter a cross-licensing
agreement. Second, we introduce a common disclosure rule in standard setting organi-
zations requiring firms to disclose intellectual property. For such a rule, we show that
unlike in the baseline model, a firm’s aspired disclosure is ex ante.
4.1 Cross-Licensing Agreements
In order to avoid patent holdup, firms often resort to cross-licensing agreements. In
the context of our model such an agreement implies that before the standard-setting
process is initiated, at time t = 0 firms commit to license each other any intellectual
property they may hold in some extensive technology class (Galasso, forthcoming).
For our discussion of cross-licensing agreements we assume that, once such an agree-
ment has been entered, communication incentives are satisfied, meaning that neither
firm has an incentive to stop the standard-setting process. We also assume that in
the non-cooperative equilibrium, firms exchange ideas until a new idea fails to arrive.
Moreover, for the sake of the argument we assume ex-post disclosure, τ ∗i = τ
a
i , for both
firms.
Under a cross-licensing agreement, firms’ joint expected surplus, at t = 0, is equal
to:
2H(0), (32)
which is equal to the sum of firms’ expected profits in a cooperative environment. A
cross-licensing agreement is feasible at stage t = 0 if firms expect to be jointly better off
under such an agreement relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome analyzed
in the previous section.
For their respective expected payoffs from the non-cooperative game, E0Ui for i =
A,B, we need to introduce two additional elements. First, at the pre-game stage
t = 0 firms do not know yet whether or not they own intellectual property. Earlier
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we referred to pii as firm i’s beliefs that firm j holds a patent. Furthermore, let p¯ii be
firm i’s own expectations that it will hold a patent. This probability reflects firm i’s
ex-ante uncertainty over the existence of proprietary technology. Let
δi := p¯i
i − pij. (33)
We will refer to a firm i as optimistic if δi > 0 and its own beliefs are higher than firm
j’s beliefs. Likewise, firm i is said to be pessimistic if δi < 0.
Second, we assume that at stage t = 0, firm i anticipates to be the initiator of the
process with probability 1/2; and responder with probability 1/2. It then anticipates a
license-fee function
σ¯i(t) =
σi(t
0
i + t− 1) + σi(t0i + t− 2)
2
(34)
for t ≥ 2 and σ¯i(1) = 0. The distinction between initiator (t0i = 1) and responder
(t0i = 2) is subtle but important. It controls for the fact that at a given t, the bargaining
leverage for an initiator i is different from the bargaining leverage for a responder i.
This is obvious in t = 2. For an initiator, Assumption 4 yields σi(2) = σi(t
0
i + 1) > 0,
yet for a responder it is σi(2) = σi(t
0
i ) = 0.
Given ex-post disclosure, τi = τ
a
i , the firms’ expected payoffs from the non-coop-
erative equilibrium are:
E0Ui = H(0) + p¯i
iΛi0(τ
a
i )− piiΛj0(τaj ) (35a)
E0Uj = H(0) + p¯i
jΛj0(τ
a
j )− pijΛi0(τai ) (35b)
with
Λi0(τ
a
i ) =
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p) σ¯i(k + 1)h(k) (36)
the expected (at t = 0) license payment to firm i. A cross-licensing agreement is thus
feasible if, and only if,
2H(0) ≥ E0Ui + E0Uj.
By equations (32), (33), (35a), and (35b) this feasibility condition is rewritten as:
δiΛ
i
0(τ
a
i ) ≤ −δjΛj0(τaj ). (37)
Two immediate conclusions can be drawn from condition (37). First, if both firms
are (weakly) optimistic, δi > 0 and δj ≥ 0, then a cross-licensing agreement is not
feasible. In this scenario, both firms expect to receive larger license payments from
their competitors than their competitors expect to pay them. In expectations, the
total net transfers are strictly positive, whereas under a cross-licensing agreement they
are equal to zero. Due to misaligned expectations about intellectual property, firms
believe to (jointly) gain under licensing in the non-cooperative game. Second, if both
firms are weakly pessimistic, δi < 0 and δj ≤ 0, then a cross-licensing agreement is
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Figure 3: Feasibility of Cross-Licensing Agreements in (δi, δj)-space
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feasible. Both firms expect to receive smaller license payments from their competitors
than their competitors expect to pay them, and the expected total net transfers are
negative.
The scenario of interest is the one where one firm is optimistic and the other pes-
simistic, δi > 0 and δj < 0. Then, the feasibility of a cross-licensing agreement depends
on the degree of optimism and pessimism as well as the shape of firms’ license-fee func-
tions σ¯i(·). We illustrate this last point in Figure 3 in which we plot the (δi, δj) pairs
such that the feasibility condition (37) is satisfied with strict equality. We use the
functional forms in (30) and (31) and parameter values α = 1/2, β = 1/2, ηi = ηj = 1,
and γj = 1/2. To vary firm i’s bargaining leverage (and license fees) we assume γi = 1/2
(solid line), γi = 1 (dashed line) and γi = 1/4 (dotted line). By condition (37), cross-
licensing agreements are not feasible for all (δi, δj) to the upper right of the lines, but
are feasible to the lower left of the lines.
For γi = 1/2, the firms are completely symmetric, and the solid line is the −45◦
line. Suppose a cross-licensing agreement is just feasible (on the solid line). If, in the
upper left quadrant, firm i becomes more pessimistic (δi becomes smaller), then firm
j must be more optimistic by the same “amount” (∆|δi| = ∆|δj|) to render the cross-
licensing agreement feasible. Let −δi = δj = 1/2. If the pessimistic firm i’s bargaining
leverage is weaker than the optimistic firm j’s, γj > γi (dotted line with γi = 1/4), then
the cross-licensing agreement is not feasible. Conversely, if i’s bargaining leverage is
stronger than j’s, γj < γi (dashed line with γi = 1), then a cross-licensing agreement
is feasible.
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We summarize the feasibility results for cross-licensing agreements in Proposition 5
with a formal proof in the appendix.
PROPOSITION 5 (Cross-Licensing Agreements). A cross-licensing agreement is
feasible only if at least one firm is pessimistic. If exactly one firm is pessimistic,
then a cross-licensing agreement is more likely to be feasible the stronger (weaker) the
bargaining leverage, σ¯i(·), of the pessimistic (optimistic) firm.
The interesting cases are where (at least) one firm is pessimistic. Proposition 5
shows that, for given degrees of optimism and pessimism, firms enter a cross-licensing
agreement if the pessimistic (optimistic) firm’s expected licensing revenue in the non-
cooperative environment is relatively large (small). The intuition for this result is
simple. The condition that determines the feasibility of cross-licensing compares the
joint payoffs under cross-licensing and non-cooperative licensing. The latter are smaller
if the expected profits that an optimistic firm can raise in the non-cooperative environ-
ment are sufficiently low and if the expected profits that a pessimistic firm can raise
in the non-cooperative environment are sufficiently high. Therefore, we can conclude
that the agreement is more feasible if for an optimistic firm the opportunity cost of
renouncing to the non-cooperative licensing payoff is small and for a pessimistic firm
the opportunity cost of giving up the non-cooperative licensing revenue is large.
4.2 Disclosure Rule and Implied Waiver
We assume the rules of the standard-setting organization to be such that firms must
disclose intellectual property prior to the conclusion of the standard-setting process.
Enforcement of this rule implies that, if patents on χt0i have not been disclosed by
the time the standard-setting process comes to an end, patents are considered to be
waived.
ASSUMPTION 5 (Implied Waiver). If the patent has not been disclosed by the time
the standard-setting process comes to an end, then σi(τi) = 0.
Ex-post disclosure comes with a loss of intellectual property. In t, a patent holder
i faces the following problem: With a probability of 1− p2 it will not reach stage t+ 2
and will thus not get to disclose. It will then lose its bargaining leverage and fraction
σi(t) of j’s product market profits. Conversely, by not delaying but disclosing in t, firm
i forgoes some license fees because σi(t) < σi(t+2). In what follows, we show how firm
i solves this tradeoff.
Since at any stage t firms cannot commit to disclose at any t + k, k ≥ 2, a patent
holder firm i can either stop, disclose, or continue and reconsider the disclosure decision
in t+2. It will delay disclosure if, and only if, its expected payoffs from disclose in t+2
(continue in t and disclose in t + 2), are at least as high as the expected payoffs from
disclose in t. Due to the lack of commitment, this does not imply that firm i indeed
discloses in t+ 2, but it will then reconsider its decision in t+ 2.
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Firm i’s expected payoffs from disclose in t, EtUˆi(D@t), and continue in t and
disclose in t+ 2, EtUˆi(D@t+ 2) are:
EtUˆi(D@t) = H(t) + σi(t)H(t)− Γjt (38a)
EtUˆi(D@t+ 2) = H(t) + p
2σi(t+ 2)H(t+ 2)− Γjt (38b)
with
Γjt =
{
piitΛˆ
j
t(τj) = pi
i
tp
τj−tσj(τj)H(τj) if t < τj and j has not yet disclosed;
σj(τj)H(t) if t > τj and j has disclosed in τj
(39)
firm i’s expected license payment to a patent holder j for the case where j has not yet
disclosed, t < τj, and the case where j disclosed in τj < t. Firm i continues in t and
delays disclosure for all t as long as EtUˆi(D@t) ≤ EtUˆi(D@t + 2) and discloses in t if,
and only if,
EtUˆi(D@t) > EtUˆi(D@t+ 2). (40)
For firms i and j aspired disclosure, we assume that both firms’ communication
constraints are satisfied and stop is dominated by either disclose in t or continue in
t and disclose in t + 2. Moreover, note that both firms continue after both patent
holders disclose (see Proposition 1). In Lemma 1 we show that a patent holder i delays
disclosure if σi(t
0
i + 2) > 0. This is because i’s payoffs from disclosure in t = t
0
i are
strictly smaller than the payoffs from continuing and disclosing in t = t0i + 2.
LEMMA 1. Firm i delays disclosure of its patent so that τi ∈ Ti \ {t0i } if, and only
if, σi(t
0
i + 2) > 0.
In the next lemma we further characterize the result in Lemma 1 and show that,
if the process allows, meaning if enough new ideas arrive, a firm i will always find it
optimal to disclose before the process stops. Let τˆai be the aspired disclosure date when
firm i discloses before firm j and τˆai (τj) be the aspired disclosure date after firm j has
disclosed.
LEMMA 2. The aspired disclosure date, τˆai > t
0
i (τˆ
a
i (τj) > t
0
i ), is finite.
The result in Lemma 2 implies ex-ante disclosure by firm i. We can now determine
firm i’s aspired disclosure date when communication incentives are not binding so that
the only reason for the standard-setting process to come to an end is when a new idea
fails to arrive.
PROPOSITION 6. Let both firms’ pre-disclosure communication incentives be sat-
isfied and σi(t
0
i + 2) > 0. Patent holders’ aspired disclosure date is 0 < τˆ
a
i < ∞
(0 < τˆai (τj) < ∞). This aspired disclosure date τˆai (τˆai (τj)) is equal to the smallest
tˆi ∈ Ti \ {t0i } such that (40) holds for all t0i ≤ t < tˆi, and > for some tˆi ≤ t < tˆi + 2.
Firm j’s disclosure does not affect firm i’s aspired disclosure, τˆai = τˆ
a
i (τj) for all
t0j < τj < τˆ
a
i (τj).
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The results in Proposition 6 apply to the situation where both firms’ communication
constraints are satisfied, i.e., both firms will not stop the standard-setting process. This
means, before disclosure, not only are the expected payoffs from delaying at least as
high as the expected payoffs from immediate disclosure in t, but expected payoffs from
delaying disclosure must be at least as high as the payoffs from stopping.24 Before
either firm has disclosed, this is the case if
H(t)− h(t) ≥ piitpτj−tσj(τj)H(τj)− p2σi(t+ 2)H(t+ 2). (41)
After firm j has disclosed, the condition that induces firm i’s continuation is
H(t)− h(t) ≥ σj(τj)(H(t)− h(t))− p2σi(t+ 2)H(t+ 2). (42)
Observe that in both cases, firm i’s own intellectual property relaxes its communication
constraint, whereas firm j’s intellectual property renders the constraint more binding.
A more binding constraint implies that, in equilibrium, firm i is more inclined to
disclose before its aspired disclosure date, so that τˆ ∗i < τˆ
a
i . Also note that if (41)
and (42) are never binding, equilibrium disclosure is equal to aspired disclosure, τˆ ∗i =
τˆai . This implies that, unlike in Propositions 3 and 4 where equilibrium disclosure is
ex ante only if firm i can salvage the process by disclosing so that firm j continues
when it otherwise would have stopped the standard-setting process, a disclosure rule
with an implied waiver (Assumption 5) always induces ex-ante equilibrium disclosure.
We therefore expect to see more frequent ex-ante disclosure of intellectual property
in standard-setting organizations that have introduced such disclosure rules. This
theoretical result is in line with the evidence documented in Layne-Farrar (2011b)
that ETSI clarification of the meaning of “timely” disclosure of patents prompted a
significant reduction of patent declarations’ average delay.
5 Standard Setting and Market Competition
In the baseline model, firms A and B are monopolists in a market of unit mass. In
the following, we extend our analysis (in line with Stein (2008)) by allowing the two
firms to compete on the product market. We thus introduce the same trade-off as in
Stein (2008). On the one hand, a longer standard-setting process increases the quality
of the standard, so firms share a common interest in continuing contributing to the
process as long as possible; on the other hand, if a firm stops and does not reveal a
new idea for improvement, it obtains a competitive advantage over its product-market
rival. This latter effect introduces an additional incentive not to contribute but to halt
communication during the standard-setting process and is consistent with the evidence
in Layne-Farrar (2011a) that, due to the incremental nature of the standard setting
24If firm i stops before firm j has disclosed, its payoffs are Uˆi(S@t|t < τj) = h(t). Instead, if firm i
stops after firm j has disclosed, then its payoffs are Uˆi(S@t|t > τj) = (1− σj(τj))h(t).
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process in ETSI, firms often develop valuable ideas right after standard publication
and use them opportunistically to gain an advantage on the product market.
Assume there is a fractional overlap of size θ ∈ (0, 1) in A’s and B’s customer bases.
In other words, firms A and B have a monopoly on a fraction (1−θ) of their customers,
but compete a` la Bertrand for the remaining fraction θ. The product market profits
are equal to:
R˜i = (1− θ)h(ni) + θmax {0, h(ni)− h(nj)} . (43)
For θ = 0, we obtain expression (2). With θ > 0, firm i raises profits equal to h(ni) in
its monopoly segment (of size 1 − θ). In the competitive segment (of size θ), firm i’s
profits are positive only if it has a larger stock of ideas than firm j, that is, if ni > nj.
To see this, suppose that the standard increases the consumers’ reservation value of
the good, then a consumer’s utility from buying brand i at price pi is given in (3). In
this case, if firm i stops the process, it markets a product that is developed on a stock
ni = nS + 1 > nj = nS of ideas. The consumers’ reservation value for product i is then
higher than for brand j, h(ni) = h(nS + 1) > h(nj). In the monopoly segment of its
market, firm i sets a price equal to pi = h(ni). In the competitive segment, firm i sets
a price pi = max {0, h(ni)− h(nj)}, with j and i 6= j.25 This yields (43) for firm i’s
total product market profits.
Alternatively, suppose the standard lowers the firms’ costs of production. If firm i
decides not to communicate a new idea, then its production costs are 1− h(nS + 1) <
1−h(nS). In the monopoly segment of its market, firm i raises a profit equal to h(ni).
In the competitive segment of its market, firm i makes positive profits because its costs
are strictly below those of firm j so that it can make a price offer just below firm
j’s. This price is just below 1− h(nj) (firm j’s production costs), so that competition
profits for firm i are 1− h(nj)− (1− h(ni)) = h(ni)− h(nj). This yields (43) for firm
i’s total product market profits.
In Section 2, we showed that in the first-best world without competition, the firms
exchange the information on the existence of relevant intellectual property and com-
municate respective ideas for standard improvement until a new idea fails to arrive.
Therefore, the first-best outcome is equaivalent to a fully cooperative equilibrium out-
come. In what follows, we determine the conditions under which this outcome can be
implemented with product market competition.
DEFINITION 1. In a cooperative equilibrium, firms i and j stop or continue so as
to maximize their joint payoffs, R˜i + R˜j.
25To see why this is the case, assume ni > nj . For prices pi = pj = 0 consumers will buy brand i
because
ui(0) = h(ni)− 0 > uj(0) = h(nj)− 0
and both firms—assuming zero production costs—make zero profits. For firm i, however, pi = 0 is
not the Bertrand equilibrium price. Let pj , then consumers will buy brand i if
ui(pi) = h(ni)− pi ≥ h(nj) = uj(0).
The highest price for which this holds true is pi = h(ni)− h(nj).
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Note that in a cooperative world, intellectual property and license fees do not
matter as they merely give rise to transfers from one firm to another and thus, do not
affect the firms’ joint payoffs. We show in the following proposition that disclosure
and communication of ideas are not part of a cooperative equilibrium if θ is sufficiently
high, with the critical value strictly greater than 1/2 and strictly less than unity. In
other words, in a highly competitive industry, standard setting cannot be sustained as
cooperative equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 7 (Cooperative Equilibrium with Competition). For sufficiently
high values of θ so that competition is too high, there is no communication in the
cooperative equilibrium. This critical value for θ lies strictly between 1/2 and 1.
For the analysis of non-cooperative equilibria below, we restrict attention to suf-
ficiently low degrees of competition. If communication cannot be implemented in a
cooperative equilibrium, it will not be implementable in a non-cooperative equilibrium.
5.1 Basic Results With Competition
In Proposition 8 we discuss the impact of competition on post- and pre-disclosure
communication incentives and firms’ aspired disclosure.
PROPOSITION 8 (Non-Cooperative Equilibrium with Competition). Competition
reduces firms’ incentives to contribute to the standard-setting process. In particular,
the conditions on post-disclosure communication incentives and the conditions on pre-
disclosure communication incentives become more binding. Aspired disclosure is not
affected by product market competition.
Competition reduces firms’ incentives to contribute to the standard, both pre- and
post-disclosure, whereas the aspired disclosure date is not altered by competition. As
for the analysis of firms’ pre-disclosure decisions, in Proposition 8 we focus on the
impact of competition on the conditions that support the separating equilibria that
lead to equilibrium disclosure before the end of the process (see Propositions 3 and
4). Although the ideal disclosure date is not influenced by the degree of competition,
the fact that competition constrains communication implies that a patent holder is
less likely to disclose at the aspired date, so the results on constrained equilibrium
disclosure become even more relevant in the presence of product market competition.
5.2 Product Market Collusion
The competition game above assumes that firms compete in a market segment of size
θ, and the profitability of a deviation from the equilibrium with communication stems
from the profit that the deviator can earn in this market segment. In the following,
we let firms collude on θ and study how collusion affects their incentives to contribute
and their disclosure decision.
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This means, when firm i in t decides to continue or stop, product market collusion
affects its decision as follows. If the process comes to an end because firm i stops in t,
then its profits from the competitive segment are θ [h(t)− h(t− 1)] under competition,
whereas the firms’ joint profits under collusion are θh(t). The joint gains from a
collusive agreement are θh(t − 1). If, instead, firm i decides to continue in t (and
assume both firms continue until a new idea fails to arrive), the expected profits from
the competitive segment under competition are 0, and the expected profits from the
competitive segment under a collusive agreement are θH(t). The joint gains from a
collusive agreement are θH(t).
The main implication from product market collusion is that communication (ex-
changing ideas) is easier to sustain in equilibrium because collusion adds more to the
payoffs from continue than to the payoffs from stop. Suppose the collusive agreement is
such that firm i receives a share of the joint gains from the agreement. Communication
is easier to sustain in equilibrium because:
θH(t) > θh(t− 1).
The consequence is that firm i’s patent disclosure will be less constrained by firm j’s
communication incentives. Note, however, that the aspired disclosure date does not
change because aspired disclosure is not affected by product market competition (see
Proposition 8) and therefore not affected by collusion in the product market.
5.3 Market Asymmetry
Assume that firm i is the monopolist in a segment 1 − θ of its market while firm j is
the monopolist in a segment of size θ¯− θ, with θ¯ ∈ (θ, 1). As before, firms compete on
the remaining fraction θ of their market.
The product market profits R˜i of firm i are not affected and as defined in equa-
tion (43). Firm j’s product market profits, however, are now equal to:
R˜j =
(
θ¯ − θ)h(nj) + θmax {0, h(nj)− h(ni)} .
With θ¯ < 1, these product market profits are smaller than the profits in equation (2)
(with θ¯ = 1). As a result, firm i’s communication incentives are weaker, and an
equilibrium with communication is less likely to be sustainable. The intuition is that,
ceteris paribus, a patent holder firm i can extract smaller license fees from firm j
because firm j’s monopolistic segment is smaller. A non-patent holder’s incentives are
not affected by the size of firm j’s market size.
Given that for the communication process to be sustained, both firms’ commu-
nication incentives must be satisfied, if θ¯ is small enough, the adverse impact on i’s
communication constraints can threaten the sustainability of the equilibrium with com-
munication and lead to earlier constrained disclosure. Again, since aspired disclosure
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does not depend on product market competition, it is not affected by market asymme-
try.
The analysis under market asymmetry, together with the insights developed below
Proposition 3 for the case of asymmetric firms, gives rise to immediate implications
when the firms have an asymmetric business model. Suppose firm j is a pure innovator
(with its technologies typically patent-protected) and not vertically integrated, i.e., it
does not manufacture final goods. This has two implications: First, firm i’s prior beliefs
pii that χt0j is patent-protected is equal to one; second, since firm j raises no profits
on the product market (being a patent holder), firm i cannot extract rents (through
license fees) from firm j. Firm i’s communication incentives are therefore weaker than
in the benchmark model. Overall, this leads to earlier equilibrium disclosure by firm i.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study how the effectiveness of the process of developing and improving
a standard is affected by the existence of patent-protected technologies. We ask to what
extent strategic disclosure of these patents undermines the work of a standard setting
organization. We present a model of industry standard setting and assume firms have
private information about their intellectual property. Expanding on the literature on
standard setting and disclosure of private information, we provide answers to two sets
of questions: (a) firms’ incentives to contribute to the development and improvement
of a standard, and (b) firms’ decisions to disclose the existence of relevant intellectual
property to other participants of the standard-setting process.
We show that if participants are allowed to disclose after the end of the process
and fully exploit their bargaining leverage (accruing from intellectual property), then
patent holders indeed aspire to disclose after the end of the process (ex-post disclosure).
However, if a patent holder cannot rely on the other participants to always contribute
to the process (and continue the standard-setting process), then it may be inclined to
disclose before the end of the process. This is the case if, absent disclosure, the other
firms stops, and the patent holder can by disclosing ex ante salvage the standard-setting
process. A similar result applies in an institutional setting that implies a waiver of
intellectual property rights if patents are not disclosed in a timely manner, and the
early disclosure results are stronger when the firms compete in the product market.
We further show that firms enter cross-licensing agreements, eliminating the strategic
aspect of patent disclosure, if at least one firm is pessimistic about the existence of its
own intellectual property.
30
References
Anton, J., and D. Yao (2002): “Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and
Contracting,” Review of Economic Studies, 69(3), 513–531.
Chiao, B., J. Lerner, and J. Tirole (2007): “The Rules of Standard Setting Organiza-
tions: An Empirical Analysis,” RAND Journal of Economics, 38(4), 905–930.
DeLacey, B., K. Herman, D. Kiron, and J. Lerner (2006): “Strategic Behavior in
Standard-Setting Organizations,” Harvard NOM Working paper 903214, Harvard Business
School, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=903214.
Farrell, J., J. Hayes, C. Shapiro, and T. Sullivan (2007): “Standard Setting, Patents,
and Hold-Up,” Antitrust Law Journal, 74(3), 603–670.
Farrell, J., and P. Klemperer (2007): “Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with
Switching Costs and Network Effects,” in Handbook of Industrial Organization, ed. by
M. Armstrong, and R. H. Porter, vol. 3, chap. 31, pp. 1967–2072. Elsevier North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
Farrell, J., and C. Shapiro (2008): “How Strong Are Weak Patents?,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 98(4), 1347–1369.
Farrell, J., and T. Simcoe (forthcoming): “Choosing the Rules for Consensus Standard-
ization,” RAND Journal of Economics.
Feldman, P. M., S. Graham, and T. S. Simcoe (2009): “Competing on Standards?
Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property and Platform Technologies,” Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy, 18(3), 775–816.
Fershtman, C., and M. I. Kamien (1992): “Cross Licensing of Complementary Technolo-
gies,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10(3), 329–348.
Galasso, A. (forthcoming): “Broad Cross-Licensing Negotiations,” Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy.
Ganglmair, B., L. M. Froeb, and G. J. Werden (forthcoming): “Patent Hold Up and
Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation,” Journal of Industrial
Economics.
Geradin, D. (2009): “Pricing Abuses by Essential Patent Holders in a Standard-Setting
Context: A View from Europe,” Antitrust Law Journal, 76(1), 329–358.
Haeussler, C., L. Jiang, J. Thursby, and M. C. Thursby (2009): “Specific and
General Information Sharing Among Academic Scientists,” NBER Working Paper 15315,
National Bureau of Economic Research, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15315.
Hellmann, T. F., and E. C. Perotti (2011): “The Circulation of Ideas in Firms and
Markets,” Management Science, 57(10), 1813–1826.
31
Layne-Farrar, A. (2011a): “Innovative or Indefensible?: An Empirical Assessment of
Patenting within Standard Settings,” International Journal of IT Standards and Stan-
dardization Research, 9(2), 1–18.
(2011b): “Is the Patent Ambush Prerequisite Met? Assessing the Extent of Ex Ante
IPR Disclosure within Standard Settings,” unpublished manuscript.
Lemley, M. A., and C. Shapiro (2007): “Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,” Texas
Law Review, 85, 1991–2049.
Lerner, J., and J. Tirole (2006): “A Model of Forum Shopping,” American Economic
Review, 96(4), 1091–1113.
Pe´rez-Castrillo, J. D., and J. Sandon´ıs (1996): “Disclosure of Know-How in Research
Joint Ventures,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15(1), 51–75.
Rysman, M., and T. S. Simcoe (2008): “Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Stan-
dard Setting Organizations,” Management Science, 54(11), 1920–1934.
Scotchmer, S. (2004): Innovation and Incentives. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Shapiro, C. (2001): “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licensing, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting,” in Innovation Policy and the Economy, ed. by A. Jaffe, J. Lerner, and
S. Stern, vol. 1, pp. 119–150. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
(2010): “Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties,” American Law and Eco-
nomics Review, 12(2), 280–318.
Shapiro, C., and H. R. Varian (1998): Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the
Network Economy. Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA.
Simcoe, T. S. (2012): “Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared
Technology Platforms,” American Economic Review, 102(1), 305–336.
Stein, J. C. (2008): “Conversations among Competitors,” American Economic Review,
98(5), 2150–2162.
Tarantino, E. (2011): “Technology Adoption in Standard Setting Organizations:
A Model of Exclusion with Complementary Inputs and Hold-Up,” TILEC Discus-
sion Paper 2011-003, Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442503.
Thompson, G. V. (1954): “Intercompany Technical Standardization in the Early American
Automobile Industry,” Journal of Economic History, 14(1), 1–20.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n (2007): “Antitrust Enforcement and
Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition,” U.S Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C., available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
32
von Hippel, E. (1987): “Cooperation Between Rivals: Informal Know-How Trading,” Re-
search Policy, 16(6), 291–302.
Weiss, M. B., and M. Sirbu (1990): “Technological Choice in Voluntary Standards Com-
mittees: An Empirical Analysis,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1, 111–
133.
33
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. First, note that the post-disclosure game is one of complete information. To show
that for both firms i and j continue in all t > max {τi, τj} is a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium strategy, and a continued standard-setting process (until a new idea fails to arrive)
the outcome in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we start with the working assumption
that both firms always continue, and show that neither has an incentive to deviate from this
strategy.
Firm i’s expected payoffs when both firms always continue are given by EtUi(C@t|τi, τj) =
[1− σj(τj) + σi(τi)]H(t) with
H(t) =
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t+ k).
This H(t) reflects the firms’ respective expected product market profits. With probability
(1− p), there will be no further ideas after time t, so the standard comprises nS = t ideas
with a total value of h(t) for both firms; with probability p (1− p), there will be exactly one
further idea after t, so the standard comprises t+ 1 ideas with a total value of h(t+ 1); with
probability p2 (1− p) there are exactly two further ideas, and so forth. Observe that H(t) is
increasing in p:
∂H(t)
∂p
=
∞∑
k=0
pk
(
k(1− p)
p
− 1
)
h(t+ k),
which, after some manipulation, can be rewritten as
∂H(t)
∂p
=
∞∑
k=0
(1 + k) pk [h(t+ k + 1)− h(t+ k)] > 0
for all p > 0.
If at stage t, firm i decides to stop, its product market profits are h(nS + 1) = h(t),
whereas firm j’s product market profits are h(nS) = h(t − 1). Firm i’s payoffs, accounting
for license fees, are equal to Ui(S@t|τi, τj) = (1− σj(τj))h(t) + σi(τi)h(t− 1). Firm i has no
incentive to deviate from its equilibrium strategy (given firm j does not deviate) if, and only
if, EtUi(C@t|τi, τj) ≥ Ui(S@t|τi, τj) for all t > max{τi, τj}. This condition can be rearranged
to read (
1 +
σi(τi)
1− σj(τj)
)
H(t)− h(t− 1)
h(t)− h(t− 1) ≥ 1. (A.1)
Since
H(t)− h(t) =
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t+ k)−
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t)
=
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p) [h(t+ k)− h(t)] ≥ 0
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holds for all t, the condition (A.1) holds for all t > max {τi, τj}, for all σi(τi) ∈ [0, 1), and for
all σj(τj) ∈ [0, 1), establishing the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Before showing the proof of the claim, we derive equations (9) and (10). Let us start
with the derivation of (9). By assumption, neither firm stops the process. Hence, when firm
i discloses in t it expects product market profits of H(t), license payments of σi(t)H(t) from
firm j, and license payments of Λjt to firm j. The derivation of (10) goes along the same
lines. When firm i decides to delay disclosure one round, then she expects with a probability
of 1− p a new idea does not arrive in t+ 1. The product market profits are h(t), and firm i
discloses in t+1 so that σi(t+1)h(t) is the license payment from firm j. With a probability of
p (1− p) a new idea arrives in t+ 1 but not in t+ 2. The product market profits are h(t+ 1),
and firm i discloses in t+ 2 so that σi(t+ 2)h(t+ 1) is the license payment from firm j. At
last, with probablity p2 new ideas arrive in both t+ 1 and t+ 2. When firm i discloses, the
expected product market profits are H(t+ 2) and the expected license payments from firm j
are σi(t+ 2)H(t+ 2). We collect terms and obtain
EtUi(D@t+ 2) = (1− p) [h(t) + σi(t+ 1)h(t)] +
p (1− p) [h(t+ 1) + σi(t+ 2)h(t+ 1)] +
p2 [H(t+ 2) + σi(t+ 2)H(t+ 2)]− piitΛjt (τaj ).
Note that H(t) = (1− p)h(t) + p (1− p)h(t+ 1) + p2H(t+ 2) and
H(t+ 1) =
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t+ 1 + k) = (1− p)h(t+ 1) +
∞∑
k=1
pk (1− p)h(t+ 1 + k)
= (1− p)h(t+ 1) + p
∞∑
k=1
pk−1 (1− p)h(t+ 1 + k)
= (1− p)h(t+ 1) + p
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t+ 2 + k)
= (1− p)h(t+ 1) + pH(t+ 2).
Collecting terms and simplifying yields the expression in (10). It remains to be shown that
EtUi(D@t+ 2) ≥ EtUi(D@t)
for all t and i = A,B. Given H(t) = (1− p)h(t) + pH(t+ 1), we can rearrange to obtain
H(t) + (1− p)σi(t+ 1)h(t) + pσi(t+ 2)H(t+ 1) =
H(t) + σi(t+ 1) [(1− p)h(t) + pH(t+ 1)]
+ pH(t+ 1) [σi(t+ 2)− σi(t+ 1)] =
H(t) + σi(t+ 1)H(t) + pH(t+ 1) [σi(t+ 2)− σi(t+ 1)] ≥ H(t) + σi(t+ 1)H(t)
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which holds since σi(t + 2) > σi(t + 1). Hence, firm i will delay disclosure until a new idea
fails to arrive. The proof for j is analogous. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Before deriving the equilibria in Lemma A2, we proof five claims made in the text:
LEMMA A1.
1. Firm j’s expected license payment to firm i when firm i is a patent holder and antici-
pated to disclose in τi ≥ t+ 2, denoted by Λit+1(τi), is given in equation (13).
2. Λit+1(τi) is increasing in τi.
3. Λit+1(τi) > σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1) for all τi ≥ t+ 2.
4. p¯ijt+1(τi) is strictly positive.
5. Λit(τi) > σi(t)h(t− 1) for all τi ≥ t+ 1.
Proof. 1. The license payment from firm j to firm i is equal to firm i’s product market
profits times σi. Suppose firm j continues in t+ 1, and let τi = t+ 2. With probability
1− p a new idea does not arrive in t+ 2 (when it is firm i’s turn), the standard-setting
process ends and firm i discloses in t + 2 ≤ τi. Firm j’s product market profits are
h(t+1) and the license payment to firm i is σi(t+2)h(t+1) times 1−p. With probability
p a new idea arrives in t + 2, and by assumption firm i discloses in τi = t + 2. Given
t+ 2 has been reached, with a probability 1− p a new idea fails to arrive in t+ 3, and
the process ends. Firm j’s product market profits are h(t+2) and the license payments
to firm i are σi(t + 2)h(t + 2), with probability p
2(1 − p). With probability p a new
idea arrives in t+ 2 and firm i discloses; with probability p a new idea arrives in t+ 3
and firm j continues; with probability 1 − p a new idea fails to arrive in t + 4. The
license payments to firm i are σi(t+ 2)h(t+ 3). Continuing in this fashion yields
Λit+1(t+ 2) = (1− p)σi(t+ 2)h(t+ 1) + p (1− p)σi(t+ 2)h(t+ 2) +
p2 (1− p)σi(t+ 2)h(t+ 3) + p3 (1− p)σi(t+ 2)h(t+ 4) + . . .
= σi(t+ 2) [(1− p)h(t+ 1) + pH(t+ 2)]
= σi(t+ 2)H(t+ 1).
Now, suppose that firm i does not disclose before τi = t + 4, i.e., it will disclose
whenever the process comes to end before t+ 4, or in t+ 4 when this stage is reached.
The expected license payments to firm i are
Λit+1(t+ 4) = (1− p)σi(t+ 2)h(t+ 1) + p (1− p)σi(t+ 3)h(t+ 2) +
p2 (1− p)σi(t+ 4)h(t+ 3) + p3 (1− p)σi(t+ 4)h(t+ 4) +
p4 (1− p)σi(t+ 4)h(t+ 5) + . . .
=
2∑
k=0
pk (1− p)σi(t+ 2 + k)h(t+ 1 + k) + p3σi(t+ 4)H(t+ 4).
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The expression in (13) is derived analogously for general τi.
2. We compare Λit+1(τi) with Λ
i
t+1(τi + ω) and show that Λ
i
t+1(τi + ω) > Λ
i
t+1(τi) for all
ω ≥ 1. From (13),
Λit+1(τi) =
τi−(t+2)∑
k=0
pk(1− p)σi(t+ 2 + k)h(t+ 1 + k) + pτi−(t+1)σi(τi)H(τi),
hence
Λit+1(τi + ω) =
τi+ω−(t+2)∑
k=0
pk(1− p)σi(t+ 2 + k)h(t+ 1 + k) +
pτi+ω−(t+1)σi(τi + ω)H(τi + ω). (A.2)
This (A.2) can be rewritten as
Λit+1(τi + ω) =
τi−(t+2)∑
k=0
pk(1− p)σi(t+ 2 + k)h(t+ 1 + k) +
pτi−(t+1)
ω−1∑
k=0
pk(1− p)σi(τi + 1 + k)h(τi + k) +
pτi+ω−(t+1)σi(τi + ω)H(τi + ω).
It follows that
Λit+1(τi + ω)− Λit+1(τi) = pτi−(t+1)
ω−1∑
k=0
pk(1− p)h(τi + k) [σi(τi + 1 + k)− σi(τi)] +
pτi+ω−(t+1) [σi(τi + ω)− σi(τi)]H(τi + ω) > 0,
because σi(τi) is increasing in τi (Assumption 4).
3. Recall that Λit+1(t + 2) = σi(t + 2)H(t + 1) so that Λ
i
t+1(t + 2) = σi(t + 2)H(t +
1) > σi(t + 1)H(t + 1) with the last inequality because σi(t) is increasing in t. Then,
σi(t + 1)H(t + 1) > σi(t + 1)h(t + 1) follows from H(t + 1) > h(t + 1) as shown in
Proposition 1 (where H(t) > h(t) for all t implies H(t + 1) > h(t + 1)). Λit+1(τi)
increasing in τi establishes the proof.
4. The numerator of p¯ijt+1(τi) in (16) is positive because h(t + 1) > h(t) and H(t +
1) > h(t + 1) (see the proof of Proposition 2). The denominator is positive because
Λit+1(τi) > σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1) for all τi ≥ t+ 2.
5. See the proof for Λit+1(τi) > σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1). Q.E.D.
In Lemma A2, we derive perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of the game played in t and
t+ 1 by firm i and firm j. The two key conditions are: (1) Firm j continues in t+ 1 if firm i
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continues in t and if j anticipates firm i to disclose in τi ≥ t+ 2 (when firm j has continued
in t+ 1) if pijt+1 < p¯i
j
t+1(τi) or (using (16)),
pijt+1 ≤
(1 + σj(τj)) [H(t+ 1)− h(t+ 1)] + σj(τj) [h(t+ 1)− h(t)]
Λit+1(τi)− σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1)
=: p¯ijt+1(τi), (A.3)
and stops otherwise. (2) When it anticipates firm j to stop in t+ 1, firm i discloses in t if
(1− σj(τj)) [H(t)− h(t)] + σi(t)H(t)
σi(t+ 1) [(1− p)h(t) + ph(t+ 1)] ≥ 1, (A.4)
and continues otherwise. Condition (A.4) is condition (19) in the text. The following notation
is used:
- α0|t = Pr(C@t|i0) is the probability with which a non-patent holder i = i0 continues
in t; 1− α0|t = Pr(S@t|i0) = 1− Pr(C@t|i0) is the probability with which it stops in
t.
- α1|t = Pr(C@t|i1) is the probability with which a patent holder i = i1 continues in t;
1−α1|t = Pr(D@t|i1) = 1−Pr(C@t|i1) is the probability with which it discloses in t.
- βt+1 = Pr(C@t+ 1|j1) is the probability with which a patent holder j = j1 continues
in t+ 1 if firm i continues in t; 1− βt+1 = Pr(S@t+ 1|j1) = 1−Pr(C@t+ 1|j1) is the
probability with which it stops in t+ 1.
For the equilibria in Lemma A2 we assume that before firm j has disclosed in τj , both
firm i types have always continued and firm j has not been able to update its beliefs so that
pijτj = pi
j . Moreover, off-equilibrium behavior is according to Proposition 2: Firm i continues
and discloses once the process has come to an end (so that τi = τ
a
i ); firm j continues.
LEMMA A2.
1. For pij ≤ p¯ijt+1(τai ), there is a pooling PBE in which both firm i types continue in t and
firm j continues in t + 1 irrespective of firm i’s action; α0|t = α1|t = βt+1 = 1. Firm
i’s equilibrium disclosure is ex post in τ∗i = τ
a
i ≥ t+ 1.
2. For pij > p¯ijt+1(τ
a
i ) and (A.4) satisfied, there is a separating PBE in which a patent
holder i = i1 discloses in t, a non-patent holder i = i0 stops in t, and firm j stops in
t+ 1 if firm i continues in t. Firm i’s equilibrium disclosure is ex ante in τ∗i = t.
3. For pij > p¯ijt+1(τ
a
i ) and (A.4) violated, there is a semi-separating PBE in which a patent
holder i = i1 continues in t; a non-patent holder i = i0 continues with probability
α0|t ∈ [0, 1] and stops with 1 − α0|t in t; firm j stops in t + 1 if firm i continues in t.
Firm i’s equilibrium disclosure is ex post in τ∗i = t+ 1.
Moreover, by Proposition 1, firm j continues in t+ 1 if firm i discloses in t.
Proof.
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1. Suppose (A.3) holds for some τi so that firm j continues in t + 1 if firm i continues
in t, βt+1 = 1. Then, by (17) and (18), both firm i types continue, α0|t = α1|t = 1.
Firm j observes firm i to continue in t, irrespective of firm i’s type. In t + 1, firm j
will therefore not be able to update its beliefs. More generally, when up to t+ 1 it has
not been able to update its beliefs, then pijt+1 = pi
j
t−1 = . . . = pi
j
τj+2
= pij , and (A.3) is
rewritten as pij ≤ p¯ijt+1(τi) for some τi. Because both firms continue in all t and t + 1
for some τi, firm i will disclose when aspired, in τi = τ
a
i , and firm j anticipates this.
Condition (A.3) is thus equal to pij ≤ p¯ijt+1(τai ).
2. Given j stops in t + 1 if firm i continues in t, because (A.4) is satisfied a patent
holder i = i1 prefers disclose to continue, α1|t = 0. In this case, firm j continues by
Proposition 2. Due to its indifference, a non-patent holder i = i0 stops, α0|t = 0 in t. In
this case, the game ends and firm j does not get to move in t+ 1. In either case, firm j
does not need to update its beliefs on the equilibrium path because its information set is
a singleton, or the game has ended. Off the equilibrium path, denoting the combination
choices of i1 and i0 by {s1, s0}, with s1 ∈ S1|t<τi and s0 ∈ S0|t, there are five cases to
be considered {C,C}, {C, S}, {D,C}, {S,C}, {S, S}. Given that pijt−1 = pij , in cases
{C,C}, {C, S} and {D,C} firm j’s beliefs satisfy
pijt+1 =
α1|tpij
α1|tpij + α0|t (1− pij)
> p¯ijt+1(τi)
if
α1|t >
p¯ijt+1(τi)
pij
1− pij
1− p¯ijt+1(τi)
α0|t. (A.5)
To see this, consider first {C,C}: (A.5) prescribes pijt+1 = pij . At {C, S}, (A.5) pre-
scribes pijt+1 = 1 > pi
j . So, in both cases Bayes’ rule can be applied and firm j would
stop in t + 1 off the equilibrium path because pijt+1 > p¯i
j
t+1(τi). At {D,C} firm j
stops if Prt+1(i = i1|C) = pij > p¯ijt+1(τi), which is again consistent with Bays’ rule
and, consequently, (A.5). Now, take {S, S} and {S,C}. At {S, S} both types stop, so
firm j does not update off the equilibrium path. Finally, at case {S,C} Bayes’ rule
cannot be applied, thus we assume that firm j’s off-equilibrium beliefs are such that
Prt+1(i = i1|C) > p¯ijt+1(τi), implying that it would stop in t+ 1 if firm i0 continues in
t. Summarizing, a sufficient condition for firm j to stop in t+ 1 is that pij > p¯ijt+1(τ
a
i ).
3. Given j stops in t+ 1 if firm i continues in t, because (A.4) is violated a patent holder
i = i1 prefers continue to disclose, α1|t = 1. Given continue in all t, off equilibrium
it will eventually disclose in τi = τ
a
i . The non-patent holder i = i0 is indifferent, and
continues with probability α0|t ∈ [0, 1]. Given α1|t and α0|t and pijt−1 = pij , firm j in
t+ 1 updates its beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. Condition (A.3) is violated if
pijt+1 =
pij
pij + α0|t (1− pij)
> p¯ijt+1(τ
a
i )
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or
1 >
p¯ijt+1(τ
a
i )
pij
1− pij
1− p¯ijt+1(τai )
α0|t,
which indeed holds for all α0|t ∈ [0, 1], because p¯ijt+1(τai ) < pij . A patent holder i = i1
does not have an incentive to mimic a non-patent holder (and induce firm j to belief it
is a non-patent holder, pijt+1 ≤ p¯ijt+1(τi)) because (A.4) is violated and because stop is
strictly dominated as it ends the process and will not allow firm j to update its beliefs
on the equilibrium path. Off the equilibrium path, firm i has disclosed and firm j’s
information set is a singleton. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. At the candidate equilibrium of Proposition 4, firm j1 discloses and firm j0 stops in
t− 1, both firm i types continue after disclosure in t, and both firm j types continue in t+ 1.
We show that under the conditions provided in the proof, this is indeed an equilibrium. The
three key conditions from the main text are (28)=(A.6), (27)=(A.7), and (24)=(A.8):
- Patent holder j1 discloses in t− 1 when firm i is anticipated to stop in t if
pijt−1 ≤ p˜ijt−1(τi) :=
(1 + σj(t− 1))H(t− 1)− pσj(t)h(t)− (1− p)h(t− 1)
Λit−1(τi)− σi(t)h(t− 1)
> 0. (A.6)
Note that continue is dominated by stop for non-patent holder j0 in t− 1.
- Given firm j has continued in t−1, both firm i types stop in t when firm j is anticipated
to continue in t+ 1 if
piit > p¯i
i
t(τj) :=
H(t)− h(t) + Λit(τi)− σi(t)h(t− 1)
Λjt (τj)− σj(t)h(t)
. (A.7)
- Firm j continues in t+ 1 when firm i is anticipated to continue in t+ 2 if
pijt+1 ≤ pˆijt+1(τi) :=
H(t+ 1)− h(t+ 1)
Λit+1(τi)− σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1)
> 0. (A.8)
We assume that before firm j takes turn in t − 1, both firms i and j types have always
continued and neither firm j nor firm i has been able to update its beliefs, so that pijt−1 = pi
j
and piit−2 = pii. Moreover, if t + 2 is reached firm i continues the process. Finally, off-
equilibrium updating is according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible. In particular, in t firm i
stops off-equilibrium if
piit =
αj1|t−1pi
i
αj1|t−1pi
i + αj0|t−1 (1− pii)
> p¯iit(τj),
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that is,
αj1|t−1 >
p¯iit(τj)
pii
1− pii
1− p¯iit(τj)
αj0|t−1, (A.9)
where
- αj0|t−1 = Pr(C@t − 1|j0) is the probability with which a non-patent holder j = j0
continues in t; 1 − αj0|t−1 = Pr(S@t − 1|j0) = 1 − Pr(C@t − 1|j0) is the probability
with which it stops in t− 1.
- αj1|t−1 = Pr(C@t−1|j1) is the probability with which a patent holder j = j1 continues
in t− 1; 1−αj1|t = Pr(D@t− 1|j1) = 1−Pr(C@t− 1|j1) is the probability with which
it discloses in t− 1.
In t− 1: By condition (A.6), if pijt−1 = pij ≤ p˜ijt−1(τi) is satisfied for some τi, then patent
holder j1 discloses if it anticipates i to stop in t. Because firm j1 continues in t− 1 for some
τi and, along the equilibrium path, firm i continues in t, firm i will disclose when aspired, in
τi = τ
a
i , and firm j anticipates this. Condition (A.6) is thus equal to pi
j ≤ p¯ijt−1(τai ).
In t: Suppose firm j has continued in t − 1. If firm i continued in t, then firm j would
continue in t+1, and both firms would continue in t+2 and later. Firm j’s aspired disclosure
date is then τaj . By condition (A.7), a patent holder i1 would indeed continue in t if pi
i
t ≤
p¯iit(τ
a
j ); conversely, a patent holder i1 would stop (had firm j continued in t−1) if piit > p¯iit(τaj )
(and so would a non-patent holder i0 as its condition is less binding; see the discussion in
the main text). Off the equilibrium path, a patent holder j1 then discloses in t. Denote the
off-equilibrium combination choice of j1 and j0 by {s1, s0}, with s1 ∈ S1|t<τj and s0 ∈ S0|t,
five (off-equilibrium) cases can arise (the equilibrium combination is {D,S}): {C,C}, {C, S},
{D,C}, {S,C} and {S, S}. Under {C,C} (A.9) prescribes piit = pii, under {C, S} it prescribes
piit = 1, and under {D,C} (A.9) is satisfied if pii ≥ piit(τaj ). Moreover, if firm j stops in t− 1
({S, S}) the game ends. In the remaining combination in which firm j1 stops and firm j0
continues in t − 1 ({S,C}), Bayes’ rule cannot be applied. In this case, firm i stops in t if
Prt(j = j1|C) > p¯ijt (τaj ), which is what we assume. Finally, along the equilibrium path firm
j discloses in t− 1, so firm i in t does not need to update its beliefs.
In t+1: If i has continued (without disclosure) in t, by condition (A.8), if pijt+1 ≤ pˆijt+1(τi)
firm j continues irrespective of its type. Moreover, both i and j continue in t+ 2 and later.
This implies that firm i will disclose when aspired, in τi = τ
a
i . Along the equilibrium path,
firm j discloses in t − 1 so, if post-disclosure firm i communication incentives are satisfied
irrespective of its type, firm j in t+1 cannot update its beliefs based on i’s move in t, therefore
pijt+1 = pi
j
t−1 = ... = pi
j .
Summarizing, if pij < min{p˜ijt−1(τai ), pˆijt+1(τai )} and pii > p¯iit(τaj ), then, on the equilibrium
path, firm j = j0 stops in t − 1 and the process is over; firm j = j1 discloses in t − 1. In t
firm i continues irrespective of its type and in t+ 1 firm j continues irrespective of its type.
Therefore, firm j1’s equilibrium disclosure is ex ante, τ
∗
j = t− 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For the proof of Lemma 1, we distinguish between the case in which firm i discloses
before firm j and the case in which firm i discloses after firm j.
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Firm i discloses before firm j: At t = t0i , immediate disclosure by firm i yields expected
payoffs of Et0i
Uˆi(D@t
0
i ) = H(t
0
i ) − piit0i Λˆ
j
t0i
(τj) because σi(t
0
i ) = 0. Delaying disclosure one
round, so that i discloses at t = t0i + 2, yields expected payoffs (evaluated at t = t
0
i ) of
Et0i
Uˆi(D@t
0
i +2) = H(t
0
i )+p
2σi(t
0
i +2)H(t
0
i +2)−piit0i Λˆ
j
t0i
(τj). Disclose at t = t
0
i is dominated
by disclose at t = t0i + 2 if, and only if, σi(t
0
i + 2) > 0 because p > 0 and
Et0i
Uˆi(D@t
0
i ) = H(t
0
i )− piit0i Λˆ
j
t0i
(τj)
< H(t0i )− piit0i Λˆ
j
t0i
(τj) + p
2σi(t
0
i + 2)H(t
0
i ) = Et0i
Uˆi(D@t
0
i + 2)
if, and only if, σi(t
0
i + 2) > 0.
Firm i discloses after firm j: For j = B, by construction of the case, firm i = A will
delay disclosure. Instead, let firm i = B (so that t0B = 2) and firm j = A. The proof is by
E2UˆB(D@4) = H(2) + p
2σB(4)H(4) > H(2) = E2UˆB(D@2) for σB(t
0
B + 2) = σB(4) > 0 and
p > 0, and the arguments presented above. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 1 we distinguish between the case in which firm i discloses
before firm j and the case in which firm i discloses after firm j.
Firm i discloses before firm j: For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume
that t ∈ (t0i ,∞) ⊂ R+. Consider the following properties of the expected payoff functions
EtUˆi(D@t) in equation (38a) and EtUˆi(D@t+ 2) in equation (38b):
P1. EtUˆi(D@t) lies in a bounded space because σi(t) and h(t) are bounded and continuous
functions, and H(t) =
∑∞
k=0 p
k (1− p)h(t+ k) and
Λˆjt (τj) = p
τj−tσj(τj)H(τj)
as defined in (39) are bounded sequences.
P2. Because lim
t→∞h(t+ k) = 1 and limt→∞σi(t) = ζi < 1 for all k ≥ 0, we get
lim
t→∞EtUˆi(D@t) = 1 + ζi − p
∆τjζj lim
t→∞pi
i
t,
lim
t→∞EtUˆi(D@t+ 2) = 1 + p
2ζi − p∆τjζj lim
t→∞pi
i
t,
with ∆τj := τj − t > 0 and p∆τjζj lim
t→∞pi
i
t <∞ as piit ∈ [0, 1].
If ζi > 0, because p < 1, in the limit the expected payoffs from delaying disclosure one
round are strictly smaller than the payoffs from disclosing right away, lim
t→∞EtUˆi(D@t) >
lim
t→∞EtUˆi(D@t+ 2), and i will not delay disclosure in the limit if, and only if, limt→∞ σi(t) =
ζi > 0. Given the results from Lemma 1, by the intermediate value theorem, and if EtUˆi(D@t)
and EtUˆi(D@t + 2) intersect at most once, there exists a finite value of tˆi > t
0
i such that
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EtUˆi(D@t+2) > EtUˆi(D@t) for all t
0
i < t < tˆi and EtUˆi(D@t+2) ≤ EtUˆi(D@t) for all t ≥ tˆi.
Setting τˆai = tˆi establishes the proof.
If EtUˆi(D@t) and EtUˆi(D@t + 2) intersect more than once, there exist multiple finite
values of tˆi > t
0
i such that EtUˆi(D@t + 2) > EtUˆi(D@t) for some t < tˆi and EtUˆi(D@t +
2) ≤ EtUˆi(D@t) for some t ≥ tˆi. Then τˆai is the smallest of these tˆi. This is because, by
Assumption 1, firm i cannot commit to disclose in t + k for any k ≥ 2. Once delaying
disclosure one round is less profitable than disclosing right away, firm i will disclose because
delaying disclosure more than one round (so to disclosure in t+ 4 or t+ 6) is not an option.
Firm i discloses after firm j: The proof for τˆai (τj) > τj being finite is by the properties of
EtUˆi presented in the case where firm i discloses before firm j, limt→∞ EtUˆi(D@t|t > τj) =
1+ζi−σj(τj), limt→∞ EtUˆi(D@t+2|t > τj) = 1+p2ζi−σj(τj), so that limt→∞ EtUˆi(D@t|τj) >
limt→∞ EtUˆi(D@t + 2|τj) for ζi > 0 because p < 1, and by the arguments presented above.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. “ONLY IF:” If both firms are optimistic and δi > 0 and δj > 0, then (37) is violated
and a cross-licensing agreement is not feasible. Both firms pessimistic is not a necessary
condition for a feasible cross-licensing agreement. Let i be optimistic and j be pessimistic,
then both the LHS and RHS of (37) are positive. A cross-licensing agreement is more likely to
be feasible with smaller LHS and greater RHS, i.e., with smaller Λi0(τ
a
i ) and greater Λ
j
0(τ
a
j ).
Because Λi0(τ
a
i ) is increasing in σ¯i(·) for both i = A,B, lower σ¯i(·) for the optimistic firm or
higher σ¯j(·) for the pessimistic firm establishes the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. The proof for the last claim follows from the observation of
EtUˆi(D@t+2|t < τj)−EtUˆi(D@t|t < τj) = EtUˆi(D@t+2|t > τj)−EtUˆi(D@t|t > τj). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. If the firms communicate their ideas until a new idea fails to arrive, then both have
the same number of ideas, nS , and their joint payoffs are
R˜A + R˜B = 2 (1− θ)h(nS).
If firm i at some point decides to stop rather than reveal a new idea, then ni = nj + 1. Their
joint payoffs in this case are
R˜i + R˜j = h(ni) + (1− 2θ)h(nj).
We analyze under which conditions a cooperative equilibrium with communication exists,
implying that communication of ideas for improvement takes place at all stages, until a new
idea fails to arrive. We show that for sufficiently high θ the joint payoffs from continuing
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communication are smaller than from not continuing, i.e.,
EtU˜
ce(C@t) < U˜ ce(S@t) (A.10)
for some t. The joint payoffs at t from continuing are
EtU˜
ce(C@t) = 2 (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t+ k),
the joint payoffs from stopping are U˜ ce(S@t) = h(t) + (1− 2θ)h(t− 1). By h(t) > h(t− 1),
U˜ ce(S@t) > 0 for all θ; EtU˜
ce(C@t) = 0 for θ = 1 and strictly positive otherwise. The critical
value θ˜ce (for which EtU˜
ce(C@t) = U ce(S@t)) is strictly smaller than unity so that there are
some θ > θ˜ce for which (A.10) holds. Note, also, that this critical value is strictly larger than
1/2. Suppose for a moment that
EtU¯
ce(C@t) = 2 (1− θ)
∞∑
k=0
pk (1− p)h(t) = 2 (1− θ)h(t).
EtU¯
ce(C@t) = U˜ ce(S@t) for θ = 1/2, and the condition in equation (A.10) holds for θ > 1/2.
Because h(t) < h(t+ k) for all k > 0, EtU˜
ce(C@t) > EtU¯
ce(C@t) and θ˜ce > 1/2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. We proceed in four steps: We show (1) that post-disclosure communication incentives
are more binding, (2) aspired disclosure is not affect by competition, and, (3) and (4), the
conditions underpinning the equilibrium in Propositions 3 and 4 become more binding under
competition.
1. Suppose all patents have been disclosed, i.e., consider t > max{τi, τj}. If a new idea
arrives, firm i in t either continues or stops. Suppose both firms always continue until
a new idea fails to arrive, then firm i’s expected payoffs are
EtU˜i(C@t|τi, τj) = (1− θ) [1− σj(τj) + σi(τi)]H(t)
That is, firm i obtains the profits from continuing the process over its monopoly segment
of size (1 − θ). Instead, suppose that firm i chooses to stop at stage t, its payoffs are
equal to
U˜i(S@t|τi, τj) = (1− σj(τj)) [h(t)− θh(t− 1)] + σi(τi)(1− θ)h(t− 1). (A.11)
For firm i to always continue the standard-setting process until a new idea fails to
arrive, EtU˜i(C@t|τi, τj) ≥ U˜i(S@t|τi, τj) must hold for all values of t > max{τi, τj}.
This condition can be rearranged to read(
1 +
σi(τi)
1− σj(τj)
)
H(t)− h(t− 1)
h(t)− h(t− 1) ≥
1
1− θ . (A.12)
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Condition (A.12) is clearly more binding than (A.1), because the LHS is the same in
both expressions and the RHS in (A.12) is strictly larger than 1. This implies that
post-disclosure communication is not granted with product market competition.
2. We now turn to the analysis of the impact of competition on aspired disclosure. The
condition that determines aspired disclosure timing compares the profits from disclosure
in t,
EtU˜i(D@t) = (1− θ)
[
(1 + σi(t))H(t)− piitΛjt (τj)
]
, (A.13)
and the profits from disclosure in t+ 2,
EtU˜i(D@t+ 2) = (1− θ)
[
H(t) + (1− p)σi(t+ 1)h(t) +
pσi(t+ 2)H(t+ 1)− piitΛjt (τj)
]
. (A.14)
It is easy to see that whether (A.14) is larger than (A.13) does not depend on the size
of the monopolistic segment, (1− θ).
3. For the analysis of pre-disclosure communication under competition, first we consider
the case in which firm j has disclosed its patent in τj and a patent holder firm i1 has to
decide when to disclose depending on firm j’s communication incentives. In Proposition
3 we show that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which firm i discloses before
the end of the process. Here, we discuss how the relevant conditions supporting this
equilibrium are affected by the presence of a competitive segment. First, in t+ 1 firm
j chooses continue or stop by comparing the following two expressions:
U˜j1(S@t+ 1|τj) =
(
1− pijt+1σi(t+ 1)
)
[h(t+ 1)− θh(t)] + σj(τj) (1− θ)h(t) (A.15)
and
Et+1U˜j1(C@t+ 1|τj ,¬S) = (1− θ)
[
(1 + σj(τj))H(t+ 1)− pijt+1Λit+1(τi)
]
, (A.16)
where Λit+1(τi) is defined in (13). Firm j will continue the process in t+1 if Et+1U˜j1(C@t+
1|τj ,¬S) ≥ U˜j1(S@t+ 1|τj), or
(1 + σj(τj)) [H(t+ 1)− h(t)]− pijt+1
[
Λit+1(τi)− σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1)
](
1− pijt+1θσi(t+ 1)
)
[h(t+ 1)− h(t)] ≥
1
1− θ . (A.17)
In absence of competition, firm j continues if (12a) is larger than (12b), that is if
(1 + σj(τj)) [H(t+ 1)− h(t)]− pijt+1
[
Λit+1(τi)− σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1)
]
h(t+ 1)− h(t) ≥ 1. (A.18)
Comparing (A.17) with (A.18), communication under competition is more difficult to
sustain if
1− θ
1− pijt+1θσi(t+ 1)
≤ 1,
which holds true for all pijt+1σi(t+ 1) < 1. Therefore, competition renders communica-
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tion incentives more binding. This implies that the relevant threshold for pijt+1 below
which firm j stops the process is lower than in absence of competition.
In Proposition 3, we show that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium that involves firm i
disclosing in t, requires the following two additional conditions to be satisfied: firm i1
prefers disclose to continue in t (that is, (19) holds true) and firm i0 stops in t when
it anticipates firm j to stop in t + 1. Note that, under competition, EtUi1(D@t|τj , C)
and EtUi1(C@t|τj , S) can be rewritten as
EtU˜i1(D@t|τj , C) = (1− θ) [1 + σi(t)− σj(τj)]H(t),
EtU˜i1(C@t|τj , S) = (1− θ)
[
(1 + σi(t+ 1)− σj(τj))h(t) +
pσi(t+ 1) (h(t+ 1)− h(t))
]
,
thus whether (19) holds true under competition does not depend on θ. Finally, if firms
compete on the product market, a non-patent holder i, anticipating that j stops in
t+ 1, strictly prefers to stop over continue
EtU˜i0(C@t|τj , S) = (1− θ) (1− σj(τj))h(t) <
U˜i0(S@t|τj) = (1− σj(τj)) [(1− θ)h(t) + θ (h(t)− h(t− 1))],
whereas it would be indifferent in the absence of competition.
We can conclude that two out of the three constraints on pre-disclosure communica-
tion incentives that support the separating equilibrium in Proposition 3 become more
binding under competition, whereas the third is not affected by competition.
4. Finally, we consider the case in which both firms j1 and i1 have not disclosed their
patents. In Proposition 4 we show that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which
firm j discloses before the end of the process. Here, we analyze how the constraints
supporting this equilibrium change in the presence of a competitive segment. The first
relevant condition regards firm j0 incentives to continue in t + 1, which gives rise to
the threshold pˆijt+1(τi) in (24). Uncer competition, firm j0 compares
Et+1U˜j0(S@t+ 1) =
(
1− pijt+1σi(t+ 1)
)
(h(t+ 1)− θh(t))
with
Et+1U˜j0(C@t+ 1|¬S) = (1− θ)
[
H(t+ 1)− pijt+1Λit+1(τi)
]
.
Therefore, continue is preferred to stop if
H(t+ 1)− h(t+ 1)− pijt+1
[
Λit+1(τi)− σi(t+ 1)h(t+ 1)
] ≥
θ
1− θ
(
1− pijt+1σi(t+ 1)
)
(h(t+ 1)− h(t)) > 0.
It is easy to see that if θ = 0 (no competition) the RHS of the expression above is zero
and the condition less binding. This means that the critical value for pijt+1 such that
firm j continues in t+ 1 is lower than in absence of competition.
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The second relevant condition concerns firm i1’s incentives in t, from which we compute
the threshold p¯iit(τj) in (27). In particular, under competition firm i1 compares
EtU˜i1(S@t) =
(
1− piitσj(t)
)
[h(t)− θh(t− 1)]
with
EtU˜i1(C@t|¬S) = (1− θ)
[
H(t)− piitΛjt (τj) + Λit(τi)
]
.
The resulting condition reads
H(t)− h(t)− piit(Λjt (τj)− σj(t)h(t)) + Λit(τi)− σi(t)h(t− 1) ≥
θ
1− θ
(
1− piitσj(t)
)
(h(t)− h(t− 1)) > 0.
Again, the RHS of the expression is zero if θ = 0 and the less binding. This means
that the threshold of piit above which firm i stops the process is lower.
In the third, and last, condition, regards firm j1’s decision to disclose in t − 1, from
which we derive p˜iit−1(τi) in (28). If firms compete on θ, this condition results from the
comparison between
Et−1U˜j1(D@t− 1|¬S) = (1− θ)
[
(1 + σj(t− 1))H(t− 1)− pijt−1Λit−1(τi)
]
and
Et−1U˜j1(C@t−1|S) = (1− θ)
[(
1−pijt−1σi(t)+σj(t)
)
h(t−1)+pσj(t) (h(t)− h(t− 1))
]
,
which is not affected by θ. Also in this case as for the conditions underpinning the
equilibrium in Proposition 3, we can conclude that two out of the three communica-
tion constraints that support the equilibrium in Proposition 4 become more binding
under competition, whereas the third is independent of the degree of product market
competition. Q.E.D.
47
